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I. SCOPE
On March 24, 1964, the Governor approved the Colorado Income
Tax Act of 1964.1 Why was this 61-page statute necessary, how did
it come into being, what is its effect, what does it mean? These
questions, among many others, will be asked by the members of
the Colorado Department of Revenue as they prepare the new regu-
lations2 and as they administratively resolve issues in the examin-
ation of returns; by taxpayers as they prepare returns; by tax ad-
visors as they assist their clients; and by the courts as they resolve
disputes between the state and the taxpayer. This article is written
with the hope that the nature of the statute will be better under-
stood so that its interpretation by the public and its advisors, the
administrators, and the courts will not lose sight of its reason for
existence. The writer has attempted to limit this article to substan-
tive matters which would be of general interest to most practition-
ers and accordingly has not discussed provisions of the Act relating
to non-residents, part-year residents, banks, regulated investment
1 Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 95, § 1. Throughout the remainder of this article
reference to the Colorado Income Tax Act of 1964 will be made to "Act,
§ -- --1
2 The Colorado Department of Revenue released a 156 page draft of pro-
posed regulations during the fall of 1964. The eagerness to explain the
new law is accentuated by the fact that regulations explaining the former
law were last published in 1951. The draft of the proposed regulations
is hereafter called the proposed regulations although the draft has not
yet been formally proposed and will probably be changed before the regu-
lations are proposed or finalized. The author wishes to emphasize that the
conclusions contained herein do not necessarily represent the thinking of
the Colorado Department of Revenue.
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companies, real estate investment trusts, and most procedural rules.
Suffice it to say that changes in these avoided areas were drafted
consistent with the basic objectives and principles as discussed be-
low.
II. BACKGROUND
The federal income tax law that we now know originated in
1913. In 1937, almost a quarter of a century later, our legislature en-
acted the first Colorado income tax law in a form which was sub-
stantially similar to the then existing federal law. The ensuing
quarter of a century saw numerous changes in the federal law,
some of which were, after a period of time, adopted as part of our
local law, but many of which were never so incorporated. Congress
continued to amend and our General Assembly continued to try to
catch up. With the wholesale revision of the federal laws in the
1954 Internal Revenue Code" it became evident that this race was
never to be won.
At that point it became obvious that if we continued to have a
federal income tax law and a completely distinct Colorado law we
would be dealing with two independent sets of complicated rules
and two independent sets of interpretations, regulations, and court
rulings. It cannot be denied that the federal laws have always been
complicated.
A second equally complicated set of local rules is unduly bur-
densome4 if the local legislature can retain the power, by local sta-
tute, to determine local revenue and to vary from the federal rules
when mandatory.
Accordingly, the General Assembly in 1955 directed the Legis-
lative Council to analyze the feasibility of relating state income tax
laws and returns to the federal laws and returns.5 In 1960, a study6
of the Denver Chamber of Commerce renewed the momentum of a
federal tie-in which had been temporarily halted by the 1959 Report
of the Governor's Tax Study Group. 7 The Chamber's study provided
the impetus for a joint effort by the Colorado Bar Association and
3 For a list of some differences between federal law and the former Colorado
law see, Lentz, Pitfalls: Conflicting Requirements of the U.S. and Colorado
Tax Statutes, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER 6TH INST. ON FED. TAX 21 (1956);
Hein, Summary of Differences Between Federal and Colorado Income
Taxes, 28 COLO. CPA REPORT 3 (1963); 1 CCH COLO. TAX RPTR. 1073
(1964).
4But See, FINANCING GOVERNMENT IN COLORADO, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
TAX STUDY GROUP 318-320 (1959).
5 H.J. Res. 20, Colo. Sess. Laws 1955, at 960.
6Denver Chamber of Commerce, Colorado's Problems, Its Taxes . . . Its
Future, at 20-26 (1960).
7Supra note 4.
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the Colorado Society of Certified Public Accountants which finally
persuaded the General Assembly in 1962 to submit a constitutional
amendment to the electorate to permit our local statutes to be tied
to federal laws.s
Immediately after approval" of the amendment in the fall of
1962, a special drafting committee, consisting of approximately
thirty-five tax practitioners representing the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion, the Colorado Society of Certified Public Accountants, the
Trust Departments of the Denver Clearing House Association, and
the Public Accountants Society of Colorado, was formed to draft
a suggested statute which would implement the constitutional
amendment. The committee analyzed the responses of all state de-
partments of revenue which had already passed such conforming
statutes. It weighed the suggestions for improvement contained in
these responses. The committee determined to use the New York
statute' as a guide for the taxation of individuals, partnerships,
trusts, and estates and the Iowa statute for the taxation of corpora-
tions.
The entire committee was divided into five sub-groups - indi-
vidual, partners and partnerships, trusts and estates, corporations,
and special taxpayers (i.e., banks, savings and loan associations, in-
surance companies, regulated investment trusts, real estate invest-
ment associations). Their charge was to determine the problems of
conformity in their particular area and to propose appropriate lan-
guage which would adopt the federal law as simply as possible
while making provision for those minimum differences which were
thought necessary for constitutional, transition from old law to new
law, or limited practical reasons. The groups were told to keep the
revenues as constant as possible but at the same time to discard the
different Colorado treatment for accounting methods, accounting
periods, definitions of inclusions, exclusions, and deductions. The
sub-groups were to make no changes in the procedural law except
S "The general assembly may by law define the income upon which income
taxes may be levied under section 17 of this article by reference to provi-
sions of the laws of the United States in effect from time to time, whether
retrospective or prospective in their operation, and shall in any such law
provide the dollar amount of personal exemptions to be allowed to the
taxpayer as a deduction. The general assembly may in any such law pro-
vide for other exceptions or modifications to any of such provisions of
the laws of the United States and for retrospective exceptions or modi-
fications to those provisions which are retrospective." COLO. CONST. art.
X, § 19, as submitted in S. Con. Res. 2, Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, at 312.
9 SECRETARY OF STATE, ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST 28 (1962). The vote was
231,784 for and 201,795 against.
10 See Franken, Miller, Petite, Shapiro, Simplification of Income Tax Returns
for New York State Taxpayers - Report to Senate Committee on Finance
and Assembly Committee on Ways and Means, 15 TAX L. Rizv. 367 (1960).
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to the extent that new concepts had to be incorporated into the
procedural sections.
The sub-groups reported their conclusions to the chairman of
the drafting committee who then met with the sub-chairmen of
these sub-groups to analyze all reports. The suggested changes were
circularized and the chairman redrafted the work product of the
sub-groups to make sure that the various reports and suggested re-
visions meshed with one another.
The redrafted work product was again circularized to the sub-
chairmen, and after necessary polishing and refinishing a proposed
draft was submitted to the committee of the whole which studied
the bill, made its suggestions, and again repolished and refinished
the language. The draft was then submitted to the council of the sec-
tion of taxation for its review, comments, suggestions, and criti-
cism. The proposed draft was repolished and revised a fourth time.
By March of 1963 the tax technicians were satisfied with their
proposed draft. At that time a series of meetings was held with rep-
resentatives of the Colorado Department of Revenue to get their
suggestions, criticisms, and comments. I doubt if so many taxpay-
ers' advisors and the Colorado Department of Revenue have ever
in the past worked so closely and so harmoniously with each other.
The results of these meetings were incorporated in the proposed
statute.
On May 3, 1963, a special joint legislative interim sub-committee
consisting of representatives of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee met with representatives
of the drafting committee and the Department of Revenue. The
proposed draft of the statute was explained and discussed. The
special legislative sub-committee appointed Senator Ranger Rogers,
Representatives William Griffith and Robert Eberhardt, and James
Wilson of the Legislative Reference Office to work with the draft-
ing committee and the Department of Revenue to finalize the draft
and determine revenue impact of the proposed changes.
The draft was finalized and was then approved and endorsed
by the Colorado Bar Association, the Colorado Society of Certified
Public Accountants, and the Public Accountants Society of Colorado.
That final draft was presented to the Joint Legislative Interim
Study Committee which, in September of 1963, approved the pro-
posed bill. At that point the attorneys, accountants, and trust offi-
cers requested Governor Love to call a special session of the legisla-
ture to consider the bill prior to the end of 1963. For various rea-
sons it was determined not to call a special session but instead to
consider this matter in the 1964 "short session."
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House Bill No. 1003 was introduced in the House; amendments
were strenuously debated and passed under the leadership of Rep-
resentative William Griffith. Further changes were made in the
Senate where the bill was carried by Senator Ranger Rogers. A
Conference Committee resolved the differences between the two
Houses. The Act, which is a product of said legislative compromise,
is explained in the following sections.
I. EXPLANATION OF THE ACT
A. RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS AND ACCOUNTING RULES
1. Rates.
The rates for individuals, estates, and trusts are the same as
they were under the former law. Rates vary from 3 to 8 per cent
of the "Colorado taxable income."" A credit equal to of 1 per
cent continues to be allowed for so much of the "Colorado taxable
income" as does not exceed $9,000.2 The credit reduces the tax by
as much as $5 in the lowest bracket and as much as $45 in the top
bracket. The net effect of the credit is to change the 3 to 8 per cent
structure to 2 2 to 8 per cent.
2. Surtax.
The additional 2 per cent surtax continues to be applied to
Colorado resident individuals whose "Colorado gross income" con-
sists of more than $5,000 of dividends, interest, and certain related
intangible income.13 Colorado gross income is specifically defined
to mean federal gross income with certain modifications. 14 There-
fore, since $100 of dividends is excluded from federal gross income,
if a husband and wife jointly own stock, no surtax will be due on
the first $10,200 of dividends and the 2 per cent surtax will apply
on any excess. If a husband and wife jointly own a bank savings
account, no surtax will be due on the first $10,000 of interest and
the 2 per cent surtax will apply to any excess.
This writer submits that the surtax is a discriminatory tax and
should be abolished especially since its revenue impact is neg-
ligible.' 5 It discriminates against residents in favor of non-residents,
against holders of stock and interest-paying securities or accounts
in favor of holders of other types of investments such as rented
11 Act, § 4(2).
12Act, § 4(3).
13 Act, § 6 (1).
14 Act, § 2(12).
15 The Department of Revenue stopped tabulating these revenues when the
exclusion was raised from $600.00 to $5,000.00. See Colo. Sess. Laws 1959,
ch. 254 at 781.
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property, against individuals who either are not in the business of
receiving dividends and interest or are in such business as sole
proprietors in favor of those who receive their dividends or interest
through partnerships, trusts, or estates.1"
The proponents of the new statute had more urgent problems
to contend with than those which would be created had they at-
tempted to defend the repeal of the surtax. Accordingly, they
adopted the existing statute verbatim except where it was neces-
sary to adopt new concepts such as "Colorado gross income" and
"Colorado net income." We strove to keep Colorado revenues from
this "discriminatory" tax constant - neither substantially increas-
ing nor decreasing such revenues. Accordingly, it seems clear that
the undistributed taxable income of Subchapter S shareholders
(which is not treated as a dividend for federal purposes) should not
be construed a quasi-dividend subject to the surtax.
3. Measure.
Federal income taxes are computed by applying the
following procedures:
Step 1. Determine the measure to which the rates are
applied. Gross income minus trade and business deduc-
tions 17 equals federal adjusted gross income which minus
personal deductions (either standard or itemized) and min-
us personal exemptions equals the federal taxable income.
Step 2. Apply the rates to the measure which equals
the tax liability before credits.
Step 3. Subtract credits from the tax liability which
will equal the amount of federal tax to be paid.
It is apparent that the taxpayers' federal income tax bill is the
end result of the inter-relationship of the tax measure, the tax rates,
and the tax credits. How could the statute best tie the Colorado
tax law to the federal law? Two alternatives are evident.
First, the statute could dictate that the Colorado income tax
would be some percentage of the federal income tax, either before
or after credits. Second, it could provide that the Colorado measure
would be the federal measure and then apply Colorado rates and
Colorado credits.
16 The dividends and interest of a sole proprietor are not reduced for this
purpose by expenses incurred in generating that income whereas expenses
of a partnership, trust or estate do offset the same type of income.
17 The term "trade and business deductions" refers to all deductions allowed
by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 62.
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The second alternative's was chosen for the following reasons:
(a) State Autonomy. State finances would be too dependent
on federal law if the Colorado rate were tied to the federal rate. If
Congress cut taxes substantially, as in 1964 and 1965, state revenues
would be seriously jeopardized. Similarly, state taxes would go up
substantially if federal taxes were raised either by broadening the
federal base or increasing the federal rates. Further, Colorado leg-
islators might believe that due to special Colorado agricultural, in-
dustrial, political, or economic conditions, specific federal rules
should not be applied in our Colorado law. For example, Colorado
is interested in assisting the infant oil shale industry. Federal law
permits oil shale to be depleted at the rate of only 15 per cent. As
we shall see, the legislature desired to grant an incentive to such
industry by increasing the depletion rate to that accorded oil wells,
i.e., 271/2 per cent. It could not have done so if we tied our tax rate
to the federal rate. By using the second alternative, our state legis-
lators retain the ultimate power to provide for different tax conse-
quences whenever such differences are deemed imperative.
(b) Constitutional Reasons. It is generally believed that Colo-
rado cannot constitutionally tax interest on federal bonds.19 Also,
because of transitional problems, an item may be taxed for federal
purposes at some point in time after Colorado has already taxed it.
If the statute simply tied rate to rate, Colorado would thereby tax
income unconstitutionally whenever a taxpayer had federal income
consisting of federal bond interest or income which had already
been taxed by Colorado. Further, the constitutional amendment it-
self provided that the legislature would determine the value of the
dependent deduction.20 This mandate could not be accomplished if
the Colorado rate were tied to the federal rate.
4. Colorado Adjusted Gross Income.
How does the statute implement the decision to tie the Colo-
rado measure to the federal measure? The law provides that the
first significant figure on the Colorado income tax return is the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income from his federal return.2 1 It is
necessary to start with adjusted gross income instead of taxable in-
1s Because the Act ties measure to measure and not rate to rate, Colorado
has no special rules regarding personal holding company taxes, accumu-
lated earnings taxes, and denial of surtax exemptions to controlled cor-
porations.
19 See Colo. Reg. § 4(b) (1951) ; Macallen Company v. Massachusetts, 279
U.S. 620 (1929) ; 31 U.S.C.A. § 742; Annot., 100 L. Ed. 637 (1956)
Annot., 99 L. Ed. 961 (1955) ; Annot., 94 L. Ed. 449 (1950).
20 Supra note 8.
21 Act, §§ 9(1), 10(1).
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come because numerous Colorado taxpayers have adjusted gross
incomes of less than $5,000 and do not itemize their personal deduc-
tions. Such taxpayers have no "taxable income" on their federal
return. They figure their tax by applying, directly to their federal
adjusted gross income, a federal table with a built-in standard de-
duction and deduction for exemptions. The last figure on their fed-
eral return representing the federal measure of income is therefore
the federal adjusted gross income.
By copying the federal adjusted gross income figure on the
Colorado return the statute automatically adopts all federal rules
regarding the includability or excludability of income. For ex-
ample, Colorado thereby automatically adopts the federal exclusion
rules regarding dividends, sick pay, scholarships, and annuities and
also adopts the six months holding period for long-term capital gain
treatment. On the other hand, Colorado automatically adopts the
federal rules concerning the non-deductibility of commuting ex-
penses and the includability of alimony by the wife.
There are four2 2 and only four modifications which are added
to the federal adjusted gross income in arriving at Colorado adjust-
ed gross income and there are eight 2 3 and only eight modifications
which reduce federal adjusted gross income in arriving at Colorado
adjusted gross income. The federal and Colorado adjusted gross in-
comes vary only if the difference is contemplated by one of the
statutory modifications; if the difference is not contemplated by
express statutory exception regardless of logic, equity, fairness, or
any other principle, the federal and Colorado adjusted gross in-
comes are identical..2 4 For example, because of old law differences
it is entirely conceivable that a corporation could have accumulated
earnings and profits of $100 for federal purposes, but of $100,000 for
Colorado purposes. The tax definition of "dividend" is restricted to
distributions from earnings and profits. Therefore, if the corpora-
tion were to distribute the $100,000 to a Colorado resident in a new
law year, only $100 of that distribution would be a dividend and
the remainder would first reduce basis of the stock to zero and the
excess would be treated as capital gain. Were it not for the Act, the
entire $100,000 would be a dividend. Similarly, if a Subchapter S
corporation distributes $100,000 which was previously taxed to the
Sub-chapter S shareholders pursuant to federal law in old law years,
22 The modifications discussed here are those which are incurred directly by
the resident individual. Such an individual may also have similar modifica-
tions which affect his return but are incurred directly by a partnership,
estate or trust. See Act, §§ 10(4)-(5).
23 Ibid.
24 Act, § 10(1).
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no portion of that distribution made in the new law year would be
taxed for Colorado purposes. All of it would have been taxed as a
dividend by Colorado had the distribution been made in an old law
year. Also, if a short-term asset is sold for 100x in a new law year
which has a Colorado basis of 60x but a federal basis of 70x, then
gain for Colorado purposes will be 30x and not 40x even though,
had that asset been sold in an old law year, Colorado would have
taxed 40x.
Numerous additional examples could be listed, but the import-
ant concept to remember is that Colorado adjusted gross income is
identical to the federal adjusted gross income if there is no specific
statutory exception which provides for a different result.
What are those specific statutory exceptions?
(a) Modifications which increase federal adjusted gross in-
come.
(1) Certain federally-excluded state interest.25 Federal law
excludes interest paid on certain governmental obligations, e.g., mu-
nicipal bonds. This modification will tax such interest as well as all
other interest on obligations of any state or any political subdivision
thereof which interest is excluded for federal purposes. An excep-
tion to the modification was intended 26 to state that federal adjusted
gross income will not be increased by interest which is specifically
exempt from income tax by other Colorado statutes.
The drafters felt that Colorado should continue to tax such
federally-excluded state interest to keep revenues constant.
(2) State income taxes deducted in arriving at federal ad-
justed gross income.2 7 State income taxes can be deducted either as
an itemized federal deduction or, under certain circumstances, as a
deduction in arriving at federal adjusted gross income. Since Colo-
rado income taxes should not be deductible in computing Colorado
taxable income, if such taxes were deducted in arriving at federal
adjusted gross income, they should be added back when computing
Colorado adjusted gross income. Income taxes imposed by other
states and deducted on the federal return are added to federal ad-
justed gross income because such taxes are claimed as a credit. If
the Colorado oil and gas production taxes are deducted in arriving
at federal adjusted gross income, said deduction is not added back
in arriving at Colorado adjusted gross income.
2 5 Act, § 10(2) (a).
26 Act, § 10(2) (a) has a misplaced comma after the word "thereof." Pro-
posed Reg. See. 10(2) (a) lists such interest which is specifically exempt
by Colorado Statute.2 7 Act, § 10(2) (b).
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(3) Federal net operating loss deduction..28s This federal
deduction must be added back since Colorado has special rules for
determining the operating loss deduction.
2 9
(4) Certain federal income tax refunds.s° Assume a tax-
payer deducted federal income taxes on a prior Colorado income
tax return which produced a Colorado tax benefit in that prior
year. If some or all of those federal taxes are refunded (Yes, Vir-
ginia, there is a Santa Claus), the refund produces no federal in-
come because the federal income taxes were never deductible on
federal returns. Former Colorado law demanded that this federal
refund be treated differently on the Colorado return and that it
should be taxed. This modification continues the difference because
it was felt that to do otherwise would substantially reduce state
revenues.
(b) Modifications which decrease federal adjusted gross in-
come.
(1) Certain interest on federal obligations?"3 Federal law
taxes interest on federal obligations issued after September 1, 1917,
with stated exceptions. It was thought necessary because of the
constitutional prohibition against state taxation of federal debt to
exempt all such interest income from federal obligations.32
(2) interest income on certain federal agency obligations.
3 3
This section is intended to exempt interest paid by federal agencies
which is subject to federal tax but which constitutionally must be
free of Colorado tax. The rationale for this modification is the same
as that for federal obligation interest.
(3) Certain pension and retirement payments.34 Federally,
all pensions are taxable except those relating to social security and
railroad retirement. Congress enacted the retirement income credit
to give other pension income similar tax-free status. Recall that the
Act ties Colorado measure to federal measure and does not tie Colo-
rado rate to federal rate. Accordingly, federal credits are not incor-
porated in the Act.
The Colorado modification for exclusion of certain pension and
retirement payments caters to those benefits which are substanti-
ally in lieu of social security coverage, e.g., state and public em-
ployees' retirement act payments, public school teachers' retirement
28 Act, § 10(2) (c).
29 Act, , 59, discussed at 350-51, infra.
30 Act, § 10(2) (d).
31 Act, § 10(3) (a).
32 See note 19 supra.
3 3 Act, § 10(3) (b).
3 4 Act, § 10(3) (c).
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fund payments, faculty emeritus fund payments, police and fire-
men's retirement benefits, and civil service retirement benefits. It
is cautiously stated that this modification applies to certain retire-
ment benefits which are "substantially" in lieu of social security
coverage. In reality an employee can conceivably receive one or
more of these special retirement benefits and also receive social se-
curity benefits as a result of simultaneous multiple employment or
working for different kinds of employers during separate periods
of the employee's productive life span. Union members receive
union-negotiated pension payments in addition to social security
benefits.
Theoretically, if the Colorado law exempts social security bene-
fits, only other retirement benefits which are in lieu of and not in
addition to social security should be exempt. From a practical stand-
point, proponents of the Act had sufficient problems without incur-
ring the wrath of groups representing civil service, public, state,
police, fire, teaching, university, and union employees for the sake
of the philosophical symmetry in the exclusion area.
(4) Basis adjustments.35 As a result of former law, taxpay-
ers can have a federal basis of property which differs from the
Colorado basis for many reasons, including different depreciation
methods, original acquisition which preceded March 1, 1937, or joint
tenancy property acquired by the surviving joint tenant. The draft-
ers felt that it was imperative for Colorado taxpayers to adopt the
federal basis for Colorado depreciation computations in new law
years regardless of the fact that the Colorado basis differs from the
federal basis. The drafters also believed that the difference in Colo-
rado and federal basis should be accounted for, if at all, only in the
year of disposition of the asset.
If, in the year of sale, a taxpayer has an asset which has an ad-
justed basis of 80 for federal purposes but 90 for Colorado purposes
and that asset is sold for 90, the federal adjusted gross income car-
ried to the Colorado return will show a gain of 10 (the gain will be
5 if the disposition is treated for federal purposes as a long-term
capital gain transaction). The modification provides that there will
be no gain for Colorado purposes and therefore 10 (or 5 if the dis-
position produced long-term capital gain) is subtracted on the Colo-
rado return from the federal adjusted gross income. Were it not for
this modification, Colorado would be taxing capital and not income.
This adjustment is a one-way street in favor of the taxpayer.




creasing modification to federal adjusted gross income. This result
was intentional. The drafters provided for modifications which for
one reason or another they felt were mandatory. To deny a taxpay-
er a reducing modification would amount to an unconstitutional tax
on capital. It was believed that the potential loss of revenue inher-
ent in a case in which the Colorado basis was less than the federal
basis was not sufficient to warrant complicating the law, accounting
records, and tax reporting.
(5) Annuities and amounts necessary to prevent double
taxation.6 Former Colorado law, but not federal law, dictated that
income and expenses of a decedent had to be accrued on the deced-
ent's last return. Therefore, if a decedent had died in an old law
year his personal representative would have been forced to accrue
all income which was receivable but not received even though the
decedent had been a cash basis taxpayer. Were the receivable col-
lected in a new law year, the federal adjusted gross income of the
recipient would include such receipt as income in respect of the
decedent.3 7 The adoption of federal adjusted gross income with no
modification would subject such income to double taxation by Colo-
rado.
Similarly, former Colorado law followed pre-1954 federal law
regarding the taxation of annuities. Colorado law dictated that 3
per cent of the cost of an annuity was income to the recipient,
whereas present federal law abandons the old 3 per cent rule and
provides that only a prorated portion of the excess of the expected
return over cost is income.38 If, applying the different rules, a tax-
payer had reported the following annuity income:
Year Colorado Federal





he would have, as of the effective date of the Act, reported $2,500
more income to Colorado than he had on his federal return. If he
were to report $500 in his 1965 federal return with no modification
to reduce his federal adjusted gross income for Colorado tax pur-
poses, he would be taxed on total Colorado annuity income, which
would exceed total federal annuity income, and would be paying
tax on that $500 once again. The proposed regulations state that he
36 Act, § 10 (3) (e).
37 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61 (a) (14), 691(a).
38 Id. § 72(b).
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will have a $500 modification in each of the years 1965, 1966, 1967,
1968, and 1969.
In order to prevent the constitutional objection of double taxa-
tion in situations such as those described above, the federal adjusted
gross income is reduced for Colorado purposes by any item of in-
come already taxed by Colorado under former law. This modifica-
tion, just as the basis adjustment, is a one-way street in the tax-
payer's favor. Again the result was intentional; the reasons for the
one-sided benefit to the taxpayer discussed in relation to the basis
adjustment apply with equal vigor here. Therefore, although fed-
eral adjusted gross income will be adjusted downward if we have
income in respect of a decedent which was accrued pursuant to
Colorado law, there is no upward adjustment provided for deduc-
tions in respect of a decedent which have been previously deducted
from the decedent's former law accrual basis return.
(6) Refunds of state income taxes.3 Income taxes paid to
Colorado and other states are deductible on the federal return but
are not deductible on the Colorado return.411 If all or a portion of
such state income taxes are subsquently refunded (Yes, Virginia,
there is also a State Santa Claus.) the amounts refunded must be
included in the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income. Were it
not for this modification, such state taxes although not deductible
on the Colorado return when paid would be income when refunded.
This would amount to double taxation by Colorado: first, paying
tax on income used to pay a tax to a state and second, paying a tax
on the portion of that same tax when it is refunded. Therefore, fed-
eral adjusted gross income is reduced by the amount of such re-
funds or credits in arriving at Colorado adjusted gross income.
(7) Net operating loss deduction.41 The function of the net
operating loss, hereafter called NOL, deduction is to cause the gov-
ernment to be a taxpayer's partner in bad times as well as good.
Federal law provides that the NOL may be carried back three years
prior to the loss year and carried forward five years subsequent to
that loss year as a deduction which offsets ordinary income dollar
for dollar.42 The federal NOL deduction produces tax refunds from
the prior years when the taxpayer was making money and further
reduces future years' income in order to recoup a portion of the loss
incurred in the loss year. Pursuant to former law Colorado was a
somewhat restrained partner. It allowed no carryback; the carry
39 Act, § 10(3) (f).4 0 Act, §§ 10(2) b, 13(3).
41Act, §§ 10(3) (g) and 59.
42 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172 (a) and (b).
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forward extended to only four years; $2,000 of the carry forward
was wasted if the carry forward produced no tax benefit; and, of
greatest importance, the NOL offset capital gains and only $2,000 of
ordinary income in the carry forward years.
The Act permits the deduction to be used as it is federally with
the following exceptions: First, a NOL will not be carried back to
an old law year, "  e.g., a 1965 NOL can be carried back to no year
but will be usable in 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970; a 1966 NOL
can be carried back to 1965 and carried forward through 1971; a
1967 NOL can be carried back to 1965 and 1966 and carried forward
through 1972. The reason for this exception was that the drafters
did not want to jeopardize past income of the state treasury re-
ceived pursuant to former law. Second, if a taxpayer incurred a
NOL in an old law year, the amount of the NOL and the number of
carry forward years are to be determined in accordance with former
law.4 4 For example a NOL incurred in 1962 of $100,000 would have
been carried forward in 1963 and 1964 and the unused excess will
be available to offset ordinary income only in 1965 and 1966. Third,
if a business has some income which is not allocated to Colorado
the amount of the NOL deduction is the portion of the NOL alloca-
ted to Colorado in the year of loss. 4a If a corporation generates a
$100,000 federal NOL with Colorado allocated income b e i n g $1
and non-Colorado source loss being $100,001, the Colorado NOL de-
duction would be zero.
(8) Oil Shale modifications.4 " This adjustment is the per-
fect example that by this Act our legislature has not surrendered its
legislative power to Washington. The modification, which was not a
part of the proposed bill submitted by the bar and the accountants,
was enacted by the House of Representatives because it was report-
ed (1) that our Washington representatives wanted a more liberal
state tax law to convince Congress that it should liberalize the cor-
responding federal rules and (2) that the then unborn oil shale in-
dustry required tax assistance to ease birth pains. I must admit that
this lawyer, who receives no depreciation, depletion, or intangible
drilling expense type deduction for his preparation-investment, still
wonders whether this difference between federal and Colorado
treatment is justified. Will this adjustment truly spell the difference
between oil shale life or death? Will this adjustment be the moving
cause which forces such industry to come to Colorado which to-
43 Act, § 59(2).
44 Act, § 59(4).
45Act, § 59(1).
46 Act, § 10 (3) (h).
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gether with Wyoming and Utah has substantially all the oil shale
deposits in the United States?
The effect of the modification is to reduce federal adjusted
gross income by a depletion deduction computed at 27 per cent
instead of the federal 15 per cent and to adopt as the measure to
which the increased depletion rate is applied the value of the shale
after it has been reduced to oil.
5. Colorado Deduction.
We have stated that the first significant figure on the Colorado
return is the federal adjusted gross income total which is copied
from the federal return. Most taxpayers' returns will be prepared
with no modifications to the federal adjusted gross income and in
such instances the preceding discussion has only academic interest.
The "bread and butter" of the Act follows.
By incorporating federal adjusted gross income Colorado auto-
matically adopted federal rules concerning, inter alia, what income
is includable, what income is excludable, what trade or business de-
ductions would be allowed, the determination of whether income or
loss is ordinary or capital, holding periods, bases, and depreciation.
The Colorado deduction adopts federal rules regarding the so-called
"personal deductions" such as interest, medical expenses, charitable
contributions, bad debts, losses, and alimony. In the Colorado ad-
justed gross income area we determine what, how much, and when
something is income. In the Colorado deduction area we determine
what, how much, and when we can deduct so-called "non-business
deductions."
(a) Colorado Standard Deduction. The Colorado deduction 47 is
claimed in one of two ways. First, the taxpayer may automatically
claim the standard deduction 4s which is the sum of the federal in-
come tax deduction discussed below and generally 10 per cent of
Colorado adjusted gross income limited to $1,000 ($500 for a married
taxpayer who files separately). This general rule is subject to the
following exceptions:
(1) Unmarried individuals whose Colorado adjusted gross
income is less than $10,000 must use a special table promulgated by
the director.
49
(2) A married individual (i) who files jointly and whose
Colorado adjusted gross income is less than $10,000 must use the
47 Act, §§ 9(1), 11 and 13(1).
48 Act, §§ 11, 12(1)-(2).
49 Act, § 12(3).
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special table or (ii) who files separately and has Colorado adjusted
gross income of less than $10,000 must also use the table.50
The Act places increased emphasis on the standard deduction
and de-emphasizes itemized deductions. Under former law, an in-
dividual could itemize even if he did not itemize on his federal re-
turn and further, either spouse could compel the other spouse to
itemize. The Act declares that if a taxpayer does not itemize on his
federal return he must use the Colorado standard deduction 1 and
further dictates that either spouse can compel the other spouse to
use the standard deduction
2.5 2
This shift in favor of the standard deduction was enacted in
order to simplify the preparation and auditing of returns. Simplifi-
cation results not only from the obvious fact that one standard de-
duction is easier to administer than composite itemized deductions
but also because the Colorado itemized deduction is tied to the fed-
eral itemized deduction. If a tax payer used the federal tables or
the federal standard deduction, to what would the Colorado item-
ized deduction be tied?
We indicated that the Colorado deduction could be claimed in
two ways: by use of the Colorado standard deduction or in certain
circumstances by use of the Colorado itemized deduction. If the
taxpayer itemized his deductions on his corresponding federal re-
turn and, in the case of spouses who file separate returns, the tax-
payer's spouse does not elect the standard deduction by use of a
table or otherwise, such taxpayer may elect the Colorado itemized
deduction.
(b) Colorado Itemized Deduction.5 . The Colorado itemized de-
duction is the total of his so-called federal "page 2" deductions, e.g.,
personal interest and taxes, medical expenses, charitable contribu-
tions, alimony, etc., with certain modifications. By starting with the
total of the federal itemized deductions the Act again implements
OAct, § 12(2) (b) and (3). A significant drafting error possibly occurs in
this section. The intent of the drafters was clearly to limit married tax-
payers to a standard deduction equal to federal income taxes plus a maxi-
mum of $1,000.00 whether they file separately or jointly. The wording of
Act, § 12(2) (b) (ii) unfortunately can be interpreted to provide a com-
bined standard deduction of federal income tax plus more than $1,000.00
if husband and wife file separately and one spouse has Colorado adjusted
gross income of more than $9,999.99 and the other has Colorado adjusted
gross income of more than $5,000.00 and less than $10,000.00. The low
income spouse might urge that she should use a table which provides a
deduction in addition to federal income taxes of between $500.01 and
$999.99. The Act should be amended to limit such low income spouse to
federal income taxes plus a maximum of $500.00.51 Act, §§ 11 and 13(1).52 Act, §§ 11 and 13(2) (a).
53 Act, § 13.
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the decision to tie the Colorado measure to the federal measure. It
automatically adopts all federal rules regarding such determinations
as the type and amount of medical expenses which may be deduct-
ed, the limitations of charitable deductions, the deductibility of ali-
mony by the payor, and the types of state and local taxes which
may be deducted.
There is one and only one modification which reduces the fed-
eral itemized deduction total thereby increasing Colorado taxable
income. There are two and only two modifications which increase
the federal itemized deduction total thereby decreasing Colorado
taxable income.
(1) Modification reducing the total federal itemized deduc-
tion.54 Included in the taxpayer's federal "page 2" deductions are
property, sales, gasoline, and income taxes imposed by Colorado
and other state and local taxing jurisdictions. All income taxes im-
posed by Colorado or any other taxing jurisdiction which were de-
ducted in the federal return are subtracted from the federal item-
ized deduction total. The Act carves out Colorado income taxes be-
cause in order to keep revenues constant it must continue to deny
the deductibility of the Colorado income tax on the Colorado re-
turn. The statute denies the deductibility of other taxing jurisdic-
tions' income taxes because such taxes reduce the Colorado tax by
way of credit.
55
(2) Modifications increasing the total federal itemized de-
duction.
(i) Federal income tax. 6 The federal government,
just as our state government, denies the deductibility of its own in-
come tax in computing that tax. This modification increases the
total of the "page 2" deductions by the corresponding year's federal
income tax liability. The computation of this federal income tax de-
duction is simplified by placing it on a mandatory accrual basis.
The taxpayer will no longer be forced to add withholdings and esti-
mate payments and subtract federal refunds for the year in ques-
tion as he had to do under the former elective cash basis method
of deducting this tax. Instead he will copy the net tax liability as
shown on one line on his corresponding federal return and inscribe
that single number as his federal income tax deduction.
The statute retains the former provision that to the extent the
federal income tax liability is related to income which produces no
income tax revenue for the State of Colorado, such portion of the
54Act, § 13(3).
55 Act, § 8.56 Act, § 13 (4) (a).
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federal tax liability may not be deducted. 7 Nevertheless, the de-
duction is continued for federal income tax liability attributable to
such items as United States interest because of the fear of taxing
indirectly that which constitutionally could not be directly taxed.
The simplicity of mandatory accrual of this deduction will have
a one-shot adverse effect on the fisc, although because of withhold-
ing and estimated tax payments this adverse effect should not be
substantial. Taxpayers who formerly claimed federal taxes on the
cash basis will be permitted to deduct on their 1965 returns to be
filed in 1966 not only the accrued 1965 federal income tax liability
but also amounts paid on their 1964 tax liability in the year 1965,
e.g., the last estimate and any additional amount paid when they
filed the federal return. This will result in a bunching of deduc-
tions. The alternatives were to deny such cash basis taxpayers the
transition deduction entirely or to prorate said transitional amounts
which would have complicated future Colorado returns. It was de-
termined that the transitional bunching of deductions would pre-
sent the fewest net problems.
(ii) Certain taxes claimed as credit on the federal re-
turn."I If a taxpayer pays taxes to a foreign country or possession
of the United States on income from sources without the United
States, such payments or obligations may be claimed either as de-
ductions or credits on the federal return.5: If the taxpayer claimed
such taxes as deductions they will reduce Colorado taxable income
buried either in the federal adjusted gross income or in the federal
itemized deductions. If they are claimed as a federal credit, except
for this modification the taxpayer would receive no Colorado tax
benefit. This results because credits are claimed after the federal
measure is determined.
6. Colorado Personal Exemptions.60
The Colorado personal exemption is the last item subtracted
from the Colorado adjusted gross income in order to complete the
Colorado adoption of the federal measure. The exemption equals the
number of federal exemptions times $750. The Act thereby adopts
all federal rules regarding definitions of dependent, gross income
57 Hopefully, the Act repudiates the clearly inequitable result of Robinson v.
Colorado, 392 P.2d 606 (Colo. 1964), in which a beneficiary was disallowed
approximately $33,000 of paid federal income taxes because under Colo-
rado law that which gave rise to federal tax was deemed corpus and there-
fore not subject to Colorado tax at the beneficiary level although it was
taxed by Colorado at the fiduciary level.
58Act, § 13(4)(b).
50 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 33, 275(a) (4) and 901.
60 Act, §§ 9 and 14.
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limitations of dependents, multiple support agreements, and depen-
dent college students. For example, those taxpayers who formerly
could deduct as a Colorado dependent an individual who had gross
income of between $600.00 and $749.99 will now lose such a deduc-
tion. Those taxpayers who formerly could not deduct as a Colorado
dependent an individual who was multiply supported or who was a
"full-time student" will gain such a deduction.
7. Credits.
60 a
The Colorado tax is determined by applying the Colorado rates
previously discussed to the resulting Colorado taxable income. This
resulting tax is reduced by withholding or estimated tax payments
and is further reduced by the credit 6' for income taxes paid to
other states, the District of Columbia, and possessions of the United
States. No substantive changes from former law were intended in
this section.
8. Accounting Methods and Periods.
62
Chaos would have resulted if the statute did not demand that
the taxpayer's method and period of accounting for Colorado pur-
poses must be the same as the federal method and period. For ex-
ample, in numerous cases a taxpayer formerly used the installment
method of reporting income for federal purposes but the accrual
method for state purposes; the death of a partner formerly termin-
ated a partnership's year but generally did not end the year for fed-
eral purposes. How could the Act effectively tie measure to mea-
sure without also adopting federal accounting methods and periods?
The Act sets forth various transitional provisions in order to make
previously diverse federal and state methods and years identical
for the future. 63 The intent was to force the Colorado taxpayer to
the federal method and period as soon as possible.
B. RESIDENT PARTNERS
1. Background.
Wholesale revisions were made in the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code in the area of the taxation of partners and partnerships. Fed-
60a The 1965 General Assembly added a food sales tax credit to the credits
discussed in the text. The sales tax credit will be added as COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 138-1-18 (1963) and provides generally that resident individuals will
receive an amount equal to $7.00 ($3.50 for the first taxable year end-
ing after June 1, 1965, and before January 1, 1966) times the number of
allowable personal exemptions. If said amount exceeds the tax due, Colo-
rado will pay said excess as an overpayment.
61 Act, § 8.




eral changes were made respecting contributions64 and distribu-
tions of property,6 5 transfers of partnership interests, 66 termination
of partnership taxable years,67 transactions between partnerships
and partners, 8 payments to retiring or deceased partners, 9 and
basis adjustments.70 Since the Colorado law was based on the fed-
eral law as of 1937 every 1954 federal change represented at least a
potential difference in the laws.
The partnership is not taxable 71 but is a tax reporting entity for
federal purposes. The federal partnership return is so constructed
that it shows (a) each partner's share of taxable income or loss (or-
dinary income less ordinary deductions),7 2 as well as (b) each part-
ner's share of items of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit which are not lumped in taxable income.7 The partner then
copies on his individual return his individual share of the partner-
ship's taxable income and specially allocated items of gain, loss, or
deduction as a part of his federal adjusted gross income. His share
of credits is not a part of his federal adjusted gross income.
2. General Provisions of Act.
The Act adopts the federal measure in this area by dictating
that the starting point of the resident partner's Colorado income is
his federal adjusted gross income.7 4 That federal adjusted gross in-
come has buried in it the individual partner's share of partnership
income gain or loss.
3. Modifications of Resident Partners.
A partnership, just as an individual, can incur those items of
income, deduction, gain, loss, or credit which the Act dictates will
produce Colorado results different from the federal. In the indivi-
dual area federal adjusted gross income and the federal itemized de-
duction were modified to give effect to these differences. In the
partnership area the modifications are first computed at the part-
nership level on the partnership's Colorado tax reporting form
7 5
and then each partner's Colorado adjusted gross income or Colora-
64 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 721.
65 Id. § 731.
66 Id. §§ 741 and 742.
671d. § 706(c) and 708.
68 Id. § 707.
69 Id. § 736.
7 0 Id. §§ 734(b), 743(b), 754, and 755.7
1 Act, § 25(1).
7 2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 702(a) (9).
73 Id. § 702(a) (1)-(8).
74Act, § 10(1).7
5 Act, § 26(1).
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do itemized deduction is modified by including his share of such
partnership modification with his other non-partnership modifica-
tions.76 For example, assume that an individual has municipal in-
terest of $100 individually and also is a member of a partnership of
which his share of partnership income and loss is 50 per cent. As-
sume that the partnership realizes $1,000 of municipal interest. The
Colorado adjusted gross income wil be determined by adding $100
and $500 to the individual's federal adjusted gross income.
The following modifications are the only adjustments which
are possible on the Colorado partnership return: certain federally
excluded interest; 77 certain interest on federal obligations; _8 in-
terest on certain federal agency obligations; T9 basis adjustments;,"
amounts to prevent double taxation;"' oil shale modifications; 2 and
foreign taxes paid by a partnership but claimed as a credit by the
partner for federal purposes.8 3 The other modifications discussed
under "Resident Individuals" are inapplicable by their nature. For
example, state and federal income taxes are not levied or refunded
on partnerships and therefore are not modifications. A partnership
as such incurs no net operating loss deduction and therefore this
type of adjustment is inappropriate in this area. The same reasoning
applies to pension and retirement fund benefits.8 4
C. CORPORATIONS
1. Measure.
The Act ties the Colorado law to the federal by applying the
former 5 per cent rate to the "net income of a corporation." 5 "Net
income" is the corporation's federal taxable income with the mod-
ifications discussed below.
2. Modifications.
The federal taxable income is increased by four items:
(a) Certain federally excluded state interest discussed at
page 346, supra.
(b) The federal net operating loss deduction discussed at
page 347, supra.
76 Act, §§ 10(5) and 26(1).
77 See page 346, supra.
78 See page 347, supra.
78 See page 347, supra.
80 See page 348, supra.
81 See page 349, supra.
82 See page 351, supra.
83 See page 355, supra.
84 See page 347, supra.
85 Act, §§ 35 and 38.
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(c) Those state income taxes discussed at pages 346 and 354,
supra, which are imposed by Colorado. The statute does not add
back to the measure state income taxes imposed by states other than
Colorado because such taxes which are allowed as credits to resi-
dent individuals are not credits to corporations.
(d) Excess charitable deductions.8 6 Former Colorado law de-
creed that a corporation could deduct only those charitable contri-
butions which did not exceeed 5 per cent of the corporation's net
income and the excess was lost. Federal law, prior to 1964, also had
a 5 per cent limitation but provided that the excess could be car-
ried forward two years. In 1964 the carryover period was extended
to five years. It was determined that future Colorado revenues
should not be reduced as a result of excess corporate contributions
made in 1963 and 1964. If a corporation incurs excess charitable de-
ductions in 1965 and thereafter, the excess will be deductible in ac-
cord with the federal law.
It should be noted that no corresponding addition was made to
an individual's Colorado adjusted gross income for excess charitable
deductions arising in 1964. Prior to 1964, federal law prohibited the
carryover of excess charitable contributions by individuals. It was
believed that complicating the statute to perhaps increase revenues
was not justified in the case of individuals because the excess which
could conceivably affect future revenues was limited to the excess
of only 1964 deductions above 30 per cent of federal adjusted gross
income.
Federal taxable income is decreased by seven items:
(1) Certain interest on federal obligations discussed at page
347, supra.
(2) Interest on certain federal agency obligations discussed
at page 347, supra.
(3) Basis adjustments discussed at page 348, supra.
(4) Amounts necessary to prevent double taxation discuss-
ed at page 349, supra.
(5) Those refunds of only the Colorado State income taxes
discussed at page 350, supra. Note that refunds of income taxes
imposed by states other than Colorado are not subtracted from fed-
eral taxable income because such refunds are properly income to
Colorado.
(6) The Colorado net operating loss deduction discussed at
page 350, supra.
(7) Oil shale modifications discussed at page 351, supra.
S6 Act, § 38(1).
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This writer believes that the statute as drafted is deficient in
the following area and that corrective legislation should be enacted
to effect the intent of the Act. A corporation may be a beneficiary
of a trust or estate and may be a partner. Specific language should
be adopted which would modify a corporation's federal taxable in-
come by its share of the Colorado fiduciary adjustment 7 and its
share of the partnership's modifications. The omission of this pro-
vision was a drafting oversight.
3. Allocation of Multi-state Income.
The allocation of multi-state income is particularly troublesome
in the corporate area even if we ignore constitutional problems. If
a resident individual has income from Colorado source and out-of-
Colorado income, Colorado taxes all and he receives a credit for in-
come taxes paid to other states. If a resident individual is a partner,
he reports his full share of partnership income regardless of where
that income was earned and he receives a deduction for taxes paid
to other states. For non-resident individuals and non-resident part-
ners special rules fragment Colorado source income from non-Colo-
rado source income and the tax is paid on only the Colorado source
income. The key to the allocation of multi-state income for indivi-
duals and partners is therefore the taxpayer's residence. For an in-
dividual or a partner it is relatively simple to determine whether
he is a resident or a non-resident. The problem of fragmentation is
further reduced from a practical standpoint because, with the pos-
sible exception of oil, gas, and hardrock mining partnerships, num-
erous non-resident equity owners are not involved in most busi-
nesses operated in unincorporated form. Under such circumstances
the method of taxing all to a resident individual or a resident part-
ner with a credit for taxes paid elsewhere and looking to source for
non-resident individuals and non-resident partners has worked with
relative practical ease.
Not so with corporations. Here the initial incidence of tax is
not at the equity owner level but is instead at the composite busi-
ness level. Further, more businesses with numerous equity owners
involved in interstate business do so in corporate rather than part-
nership form. The net result is that the stakes are considerably
higher in the determination of what portion of corporate multi-state
income should be taxed by Colorado and what portion by other
states. Additionally, the residence of a multi-state corporation is
almost impossible of determination - should the criteria be the
state of incorporation, the location of principal physical assets, man-
87 See page 366, infra.
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agement offices or payroll, the origin or destination of sales, or
what? If a predominantly manufacturing state chooses to place pri-
mary emphasis on the location of the point of production should a
state, if it determines that it is primarily a consuming state, be pre-
cluded from emphasizing the point of the destination of the goods?
The result has been a rather topsy-turvy growth of various state al-
location procedures which evidence the balancing of concepts of
what is a fair allocation with the very real problem of getting as
much revenue as possible from foreign non-voters. Some states
permit separate accounting, some do not; some use a pure formula
method of allocating income, others combine formulae with direct
allocation; some formulae are based on two factors, i.e., sales and
property, others apply three factors, i.e., sales, property, and pay-
roll.
At the time this Act was drafted, the United States Supreme
Court had upheld a tax on the net income of a foreign corporation
with an in-state sales office whose orders were approved and filled
out-of-state5 8 Further, the Supreme Court had refused to review
a decision sustaining an income tax where the only in-state contact
was the solicitation of orders.8 90 Congress had passed P.L. 86-272, 1°
prohibiting taxation in certain limited cases, and a congressional
study group was attempting to reach some definitive conclusions to
bring order from chaos."1
The drafting group concluded that the best way to provide for
allocation of multi-state corporate income in this state of confusion
was to readopt existing allocation rules and make no substantial
changes. The Act therefore allocates multi-state income in basical-
ly9 2 the same manner as was true under former law. The Colorado
Department of Revenue has added a gloss in this area by an oral
acknowledgment that it no longer considers P.L. 86-272 unconsti-
tutional 93 and therefore it will so intepret the Act that the minimum
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959).
89 International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958),
cert. denied. 359 U.S. 984 (1959)
9073 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384.
91 The results have been published as H.R.REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964).
92 Act, § 37. Section 37(2) (b) now declares that property shall be valued in
both the numerator and denominator at the "net book value recognized
for federal income tax purposes."
It may be of some historical importance to note that the Department
of Revenue unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the legislature to amend
the property factor by including in the numerator and denominator cap-
italized rentals.
93 Evidently Colorado will abide by the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d
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contacts set forth in P.L. 86-272 will produce no tax.
The approach of the proposed regulations in this area is of par-
ticular importance. They dictate that the first determination to be
made is whether the corporation does any business out of Colorado.
If it does not it will be considered a unitary business and all income
will be allocated to Colorado; the allocation steps outlined below
will not apply. The confusion of the following proposed regulations,
admittedly taken out of context, is understandable only if the con-
fusion in the law as pronounced by our courts and legislatures is
recognized. Compare the sentence:
Irrespective of the nature of its activities, every cor-
portion organized for profit and carrying out any of the
purposes of its organization in this State is doing business
in this State.
4
with the following sentence:
Corporations which have neither employees nor stocks
of goods in Colorado, and which engage in no activities
here, other than the shipping of goods to customers in this
State pursuant to orders received by mail, telephone or
telegraph, are neither doing business nor deriving income
from sources in this State and are, accordingly, not taxable
under this Act.95
and also the following sentence:
The term 'doing business' as used for purposes of pro-
cess, or the fact that a corporation is qualified to do busi-
ness in another state under the laws of such other state
will have no standing under this Act.96
This author interprets the proposed regulations to mean that if a
corporation has any contact with Colorado, Colorado will tax some
or all income and it will assert no taxing jurisdiction only in the
isolated case where the sole contact consists of shipping to Colorado
customers pursuant to orders received, accepted, and filled out of
Colorado by a corporation that has no Colorado employees and no
Colorado inventory. It should be noted that such interpretation pro-
bably conflicts with P.L. 86-272 notwithstanding the oral acknowl-
edgement to abide by P.L. 86-272, and also that tax avoidance is
made possible in the following case: Assume a Colorado unitary
business whose only contacts with another state, which state im-
poses no income tax, are (1) delivery in the other state and (2) at
314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964), in which Colorado filed an amicus
curiae brief.
94 Proposed Reg. § 35.
95 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
96 Proposed Reg. § 37.
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least "one employee" in the other state. Under the proposed regula-
tions since there is an out-of-state "employee" the sales delivery
to the other state should logically be free of Colorado tax.
The proposed regulations dictate that the second determination
to be made is the allocation of a corporation's income if it is deter-
mined that a corporation does some business out-of-Colorado:
(a) Dividends, gains, and losses from corporate stock, royal-
ties, and similar intangible rights are directly allocated to the prin-
cipal place of the corporation's business. (Principal place of business
is interpreted to be the nerve center of the corporation.)1 7 Rents
and gains or losses from capital assets are directly allocated to the
situs of the property producing such income or loss. (The proposed
regulations include a questionable definition of rents by stating that
if one of the principal business functions of a corporation is the
rental of tangibles that such income is not "rent" and will not be
directly allocated.) "
(b) The remainder of the income or loss is allocated accord-
ing to a two-factor, property and sales, formula.!'
The Act for the first time permits consolidated returns. 10° It is
hoped that the final regulations, unlike the proposed regulations, 10 1
will permit the filing of consolidated returns if federal consolidated
returns are filed.
The Act continues the former rule which has questionable con-
stitutional validity that the above allocation procedures may be
nullified by the Director if, "it shall appear to [his] satisfaction
[that the general allocation statute] does not properly reflect the
amount of income derived from sources within Colorado" and that
in such case he is, "authorized in his discretion to determine a
method of allocation or apportionment as is fairly calculated to de-







99 Proposed Reg. § 37(2).
lo0 Act, § 39.
101 "Such permission will not be granted unless it is demonstrated to the sat-
isfaction of the director by an overwhelming preponderance of evidence
that the purposes in filing such a consolidated return are legitimate bus-
iness purposes, or that such consolidated return will produce a more
realistic and equitable Colorado tax liability, and that the purpose is not
the evasion of tax under this Act." Proposed Reg. § 39.
102 Act, § 37 (4).
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D. TRUSTS AND ESTATES
1. Background.
Former Colorado law was based on pre-1954 federal law. The
theory was that the income of a trust or estate should be taxed only
once - either to the trust or the beneficiary. The fiduciary paid a
tax on basically all income except for that income which was dis-
tributed or distributable to the beneficiary. Such income produced
a deduction to the fiduiary and was includible by the beneficiary.
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code made wholesale revisions in
this area just as it did in the partnership sections. The basic change
was to give the fiduciary a deduction 10 3 and demand inclusion by
the beneficiary 10 4 of all amounts paid or payable by the fiduciary,
whether the source of such amounts was from income or principal
(limited to the fiduciary's "distributable net income"). Distribut-
able net income is defined'05 as taxable income modified by the de-
duction for distributions, the deduction for personal exemptions,
certain capital gains and losses, certain extraordinary dividends and
taxable stock dividends, tax exempt interest, certain income of for-
eign trusts, and excluded dividends.
2. Taxation of the Resident Fiduciary.
The Act dictates that the fiduciary copy its federal taxable in-
come 10 6 as the starting point in the determination of the Colorado
measure. Four modifications are made to the federal taxable income
to arrive at Colorado taxable income. The rates for resident indi-
viduals previously discussed at page 342, supra, are then applied
to the Colorado taxable income.
(a) Colorado exemption. 10 7 $750 is subtracted from the fed-
eral taxable income. This amount is equal to the former exemption
allowed fiduciaries. A fiduciary must add the exemption claimed on
the federal return which has reduced the federal taxable income.
The addition will be $600 for an estate, $300 for a "simple trust," and
$100 for a "complex trust."10s
(b) Basis and double taxation modifications not in distribut-
able net income.10 9 If the trust or estate realized gain in a case
103 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 661.
104 Id. § 662.
105 Id. § 643(a).
106 Act, § 45.
107 Act, § 45 (1).
108 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642 (b).
109 Act, § 45(2). The language of the Act is especially misleading in this
section. The terms of the statute refer to all modifications described in
sections 10 and 13 and are not expressly limited to the basis and double
taxation adjustments. Somewhere between the submission of the "Bar Bill"
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where its Colorado basis was greater than the federal basis, a mod-
ification is just as necessary as it was for a resident individual dis-
cussed at page 348, supra. The same holds true for a modification
to prevent double taxation discussed at page 349, supra. The Act
adopts the New York philosophy that these particular modifications
will be made on the fiduciary's return only if they relate to items
which are excluded from distributable net income. For example, a
trust sells a capital asset for $100 which has a federal basis of $70
and a Colorado basis of $95 and was held for more than six months.
The trust is either silent regarding the allocation of capital gains to
corpus or income or specifies that such gains will be allocated to
corpus. Federal taxable income includes a gain of $15 ($30 less $15
as a long-term capital gain deduction). The fiduciary will claim a
modification of $12.50 (one-half of the difference between $95 and
$70).
(c) Fiduciary's share of fiduciary adjustment."" The fiduci-
ary adjustment and its allocation between the fiduciary and the
beneficiary is discussed at page 366, infra.
(d) Certain non-resident beneficiary trusts.1 ' Wyoming and
Nebraska have no state income tax. Assume that a trustor made a
Colorado bank trustee of a trust for the benefit of a Wyoming or a
Nebraska beneficiary. Assume further than someone other than the
trustee has the power to remove the principal from Colorado by
revocation, removal of trustee, or otherwise, and that the income
is either distributed or required to be distributed to such benefici-
ary. With no special rule, Colorado would tax such income. Because
of the fear that such trust business would be removed from Colo-
rado, the former law provided exemption from tax in such circum-
stances. The Act, with this modification, continues such exemp-
tion.
3. Taxation of the Resident Beneficiary.11 2
We have discussed the taxation of the resident individual, the
resident partner, the corporation, and the resident fiduciary. In so
to the Colorado Department of Revenue and the printing of H.B. 1003,
the words "sections 138-1-10 and 138-1-13" were inserted for the words
"'section 138-1-10(3) (d) or (e)." The present statute does not implement
the correct theory for two reasons, (1) the drafters intended no change
from the New York approach in this area and (2) the present wording
conflicts with the second sentence of section 46(2). As the statute now
reads it would be possible for modifications affecting extraordinary divi-






DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
doing, we analyzed the taxation of the resident beneficiary except
for the beneficiary's share of the fiduciary adjustment. For example,
the resident individual who is a beneficiary has automatically ac-
counted for his share of the income of the estate or trust when he
copies his federal adjusted gross income. The portion of such trust
or estate income which he must report, except for the beneficiary's
share of the fiduciary adjustment,' is buried in the federal adjust-
ed gross income figure.
4. Fiduciary Adjustment.
In the area of partner and partnership taxation by Colorado
the Act adopts the federal adjusted gross income measure at the
partner level and similarly applies all modifications to that mea-
sure at the partner level. Contrariwise, in the area of corporate tax-
ation by Colorado, we adopted the federal taxable income measure
at the business level and applied all modifications to that measure
at the same level.
In the area of taxation by Colorado of fiduciaries and bene-
ficiaries, the Act creates a schizoid. It adopts federal taxable income
of the fiduciary as its starting point, just as it did with corporations.
The Act further adopts federal adjusted gross income of the bene-
ficiary as its starting point, just as we did with partners. But, the
modifications provided for in the Act relating to the income of an
estate or trust, i.e., federal interest, Colorado income taxes deducted
by fiduciary, the federal income tax liability, etc., are not applied
solely at the fiduciary level or solely at the beneficiary level. In-
stead, the fiduciary adjustment is allocated between the fiduciary
and the beneficiary. What is the "fiduciary adjustment" and how do
we determine what portion must be accounted for by the fiduciary
and what portion by the beneficiary?
With two exceptions, the fiduciary adjustment" 4 is the net
total of all modifications discussed in connection with resident in-
dividuals which apply to trusts or estates whether or not such mod-
ifications relate to items which are a part of federal distributable
net income. All modifications, with the two exceptions, are thrown
into one pot and the potpourri is called the fiduciary adjustment.
The two exceptions are the basis and double taxation modifications
which are not in distributable net income."5, These two exceptions
113 Act, §§ 10(4) and 46.
114 Act, § 46 (2).
115 Act, § 46(2), second sentence. This sentence was adopted from the New
York Statute which, contrary to the Colorado Statute, does not permit the
deductibility of the federal tax on the state return. The Colorado Depart-
ment of Revenue proposes that the entire federal tax paid by the fiduciary
should be a deduction to it on its Colorado return. The present wording
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are not thrown into any pot for division between the fiduciary and
the beneficiary; instead, 100 per cent of these exceptions are de-
ducted by the fiduciary as discussed at page 364, supra.
The fiduciary adjustment is allocated between the fiduciary
and the beneficiaries in proportion to their respective shares of the
fiduciary's distributable net income. 1"" In a simple trust, 100 per
cent of the fiduciary adjustment will be allocated to the beneficiar-
ies. In a complex trust, if the trust has $50,000 of distributable net
income and distributes $10,000 to each of two beneficiaries, the fidu-
ciary adjustment will be allocated three-fifths to the trust and one-
fifth to each of the beneficiaries. Special rules are provided in the
unusual case that a fiduciary generates modifications but generates




The Act states that organizations will be exempt from tax to
the extent that they are exempt for federal purposes.'" The pro-
posed regulations11'" further condition exemption on the submission
to the director of evidence of federal exemption. The statute makes
no demand of the necessity of evidence of federal exemption, nor
was it the intent of the drafters that the Colorado exemption would
be denied to an organization that does in fact satisfy federal law
merely because it has not formally applied for exemption from the
Internal Revenue Service or has lost its letter of exemption. The
Act does tax the unrelated business income of exempt organiza-
tions."
2 0
dictates that if we have a discretionary trust with $40,000 of distributable
net income which pays out only $20,000 to beneficiaries, the resulting
federal tax of approximately $6,000 which is incurred entirely by the
trustee is deductible $3,000 by the fiduciary 20,000 x6,000 and $3,000
by the beneficiaries. This author agrees that section 45(2) should be
amended to read:
There shall be subtracted the modifications described in section
138-1-19 (3) (d) and (e), to the extent such items are excluded from
federal distributable net income of the estate or trust, and section
138-1-13 (4) (a).
A corresponding change should be made to the second sentence of section
46 (2). The effect of these changes would be that the entire federal income
tax liability incurred by the trustee would be deductible by the trustees
and such modification would not be allocated in part to the beneficiary.
1 6 Act, § 46(3) (a).
117 Act, § 46(3) (b).
118 Act, § 17(1).
119 Proposed Reg. § 17.
120 Act, § 17(2).
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2. Subchapter S Corporations.
A Subchapter S corporation is not an exempt organization al-
though it is not subject to tax so long as the federal election re-
mains in effect. 121 The proposed regulations 122 allocate the multi-
state income of a Subchapter S corporation according to partner-
ship rules and not corporation rules. Accordingly, all of his share of
the Subchapter S multi-state undistributed taxable income will
be taxed to a resident shareholder and only the Colorado source
portion of such Subchapter S multi-state undistributed taxable in-
come will be taxed to a non-resident shareholder.
The drafters had assumed, contrary to the proposed regulations,
that multi-state Subchapter S income would be allocated as other
intangible income. The drafters thought it best to tax all multi-state
Subchapter S income to resident shareholders and tax no part of
such income to non-resident shareholders. The drafters' thinking,
contrary to that of the proposed regulations, would have relieved
the corporation from allocating income if one shareholder were a
non-resident and also would have denied the State any tax from a
non-resident shareholder's share of Colorado source Subchapter S
income. Only time will tell whether the final regulations continue
the partnership-type allocation, and if so, whether the courts will





As indicated in the beginning of this article, the drafters were
concerned principally with the substantive changes to be made.
Nevertheless, the Act does differ from former law in the procedural
areas as follows:
(a) Filing requirements incorporated the federal concept of
income.
1 24
(b) For the first time, the director is given statutory author-
ity to promulgate rates and tables which will allow employers to
compute sliding scale state withholding by reference to federal
withholding.
12 5
121 Act, § 36.
122 Proposed Reg. § 36.
123 Act, §§ 10(1), 15(2).
123a Extensive revisions to the procedural rules were enacted by the 1965 Gen-
eral Assembly. These changes, which will be added as Chapter 138, Article
9, COLO. REV. STAT. (1963), affect procedural rules relating to income,
gross ton-mile, passenger-mile, motor fuel, cigarette, sales, and use taxes.
124 Act, § 65.
1
2
5 Act, § 68 (3) (a).
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(c) The determination of the necessity of filing declarations
of estimated tax are to be made consistent with federal law.
126
(d) The "floor" for determining the necessity of filing an es-
timated tax return was raised from a yearly estimated tax of $20
to $40.127
(e) Extremely significant revisions were made in the area of
extending the Colorado statute of limitations for assessment and
refunds if the federal statute of limitations is extended.
The general federal statute of limitations 2 s prohibits the as-
sessment of federal deficiencies more than three years after the re-
turn is filed. The comparable portion of the former Colorado law
l2 sa
and the Act' 2 9 prolong the period of repose to four years. In addi-
tion, the former Colorado law provided:
Any final determination of the federal net income
made pursuant to the provisions of federal law under which
such net income is found to differ from the net income
originally reported to the federal government shall be re-
ported by the taxpayer to the director of revenue within
thirty days of receipt by the taxpayer of notice of such
final determination, with a statement of the reasons for the
difference, in such detail as the director may require. If
from such report or from investigation it shall appear that
the tax with respect to income imposed by this article has
not been fully assessed, the director shall within one year
of the receipt of such report or within one year of dis-
covery of such determination, if unreported, assess the
deficiency . . . The statute of limitations shall not apply
in the instance of any taxpayer who, within the time
specified, fails to make a report of any such change made
by the said commissioner of internal revenue, or other of-
ficer of the United States or competent authority . 3
The Department of Revenue, by administrative fiat, placed the fol-
lowing interpretations on this exception to the statute of limita-
tions:
(a) The final determination which had to be reported was
the receipt of a revenue agent's proposed adjustment although it
was never quite clear to this author whether the Department con-
sidered the 10-day, the 15-day, the 30-day, or the 90-day letter to be
126 Act, § 69 (1).
12T Ibid.
128 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a).
128a Colo. REV. STAT. § 138-1-39(1) (1963).
129 Act, § 89(1).
130 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-1-29(5) (1963).
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the revenue agent's report which had sufficient authority to be
deemed a final determination.
(b) Even though the four-year Colorado statute had run be-
fore the final determination, if the taxpayer did not file his report
of federal change within the 30-day period, the Colorado statute of
limitations was revived and would not be deemed to finally run
until one year after the receipt of the report or the discovery of the
federal change.
(c) If a federal change were made 46 months after the Colo-
rado return was filed and the taxpayer duly notified the director,
the statute was tolled until one year after the receipt of the notice
of change.
The drafters believed the Department's interpretations to be of
questionable validity at best. The Department, in the drafting stages,
agreed not to contest suggested legislative changes in this area if
some mechanism could be devised to extend the Colorado statute
of limitations when the federal statute was prolonged. It should be
noted that the Department indicated that by its acquiescence it did
not mean to imply that its interpretation of former law was incor-
rect. The Act presently provides:
(a) If the federal statute is extended by consent or by ad-
ministrative or judicial proceedings, the normal Colorado four-year
statute will not expire prior to one year after the expiration of the
extended federal period, 3' and
(b) if a federal final determination is not reported to the di-
rector within 30 days, the Colorado statute is tolled only from the
end of that 30-day period to the time the final determination is re-
ported or, if earlier, until the director discovers the final determina-
tion. 1 32 "Final determination" is, for the first time, specifically de-
fined.133 The drafters felt that the Department should be notified
when the dispute between the taxpayer and the federal government
first reaches the stage that the taxpayer is voluntarily or involun-
tarily committed to conclude that he must pay the proposed federal
deficiency. The Act assumes that if the federal government is going
to receive additional taxes then, at that point in time, Colorado
should be advised of the federal change. Accordingly, final determ-
ination is defined to be the first time that the federal government
can put its billing machinery into operation, i.e., when the taxpayer
or the government offer or accept a waiver of assessment and col-
131 Act, § 65 (6) (e).
132 Act, § 65 (6) (d).
133 Act, § 65 (6) (b).
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lection of deficiency, 1 " when the taxpayer pays any additional
tax,135 or when court judgment becomes final.
1 3 6
The drafters trust that it is now clear that a federal final de-
termination can only toll the Colorado statute, but cannot revive it,
if not reported to the director within 30 days, and then only until
the final determination is reported or discovered. It should also be
noted that the Act provides a two-way street so that claims for re-




Except for the withholding provisions, the Act affects taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1964.1 3s
IV. CONCLUSION
This writer acknowledges that the Act is not perfect and al-
ludes to some of the sections which must be amended. Additional
changes will become apparent as we work with the new law. It is
hoped that such technical changes will be relatively few because of
the hundreds of donated man-hours which preceded its enactment.
By the same token, this writer submits that new legislatures will
do the public no real service by hastily changing substantive provi-
sions so that additional differences will be created in the federal and
Colorado measure of income. The Act as drafted with mandatory
technical changes will accomplish the following objectives:
1. The vast majority of taxpayers will be abie to complete
their Colorado income tax returns without being forced to struggle
with the legion differences which formerly existed. Almost all of
the information required for the Colorado returns can now be
copied directly from the federal returns.
2. It is expected that the Act will broaden the base because
administrative enforcement and taxpayer compliance is greater at
the federal level than at the state level. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has what to the Colorado Department of Revenue must appear
to be substantial funds with which to enforce the law. Additionally,
it is generally believed that taxpayers incur greater psychological
trauma if they have a tendency to "fudge" federally than is true at
the local level.
134 Act, § 65(6) (b) (i), (ii), and (iii).
35 Act, § 65(6) (b) (iv).
136 Act, § 65 (6) (b) (v).
1"7 Act, § 65(6) (f).
13S Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 95, § 4 at 810.
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3. The Act will permit the Colorado Department of Revenue
to economically utilize information obtained by the federal govern-
ment from the federal electronic data processing equipment and
federal audits to a much greater extent than was formerly possible.
State machines will be able to process more information with the
result that manpower can now be used more effectively. The fed-
eral information was always available but could not be economical-
ly utilized so long as there were minor but numerous differences
between the federal and Colorado returns. The greater utilization of
the federal by-product amounts to an indirect federal grant-in-aid.
4. The Act will promote uniformity and relative ease of in-
terpretation by the automatic adoption of current federal regula-
tions, rulings, and case law.
It requires no omniscience to realize that the state's need for
money in many areas - including primary, secondary, and higher
education, mental and physical medical services and programs, re-
habilitating correctional programs and institutions - will increase.
The state has but three broad-based taxes to accommodate these
needs: property, sales, and income. Whether or not increased use is
made of the property and sales taxes, it is fairly obvious that future
additional emphasis will be placed on the state income tax. We hope
that the Act, as interpreted by the Department of Revenue and the
courts, will create an efficient mechanism to ensure that, whether
directly paid to the government as tax or indirectly paid in the form
of accounting and legal compliance costs, as much of the state im-
position as possible reaches the deleted state programs and services
which are demanded.
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NOTE
SECURITIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF 1964
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 1933, President Roosevelt delivered a message to
Congress recommending "legislation for Federal supervision of
traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce."' Two
months later Congress responded with the Securities Act of 1933,2
which regulates principally the initial distribution of securities.'
A need for further legislation to regulate trading after the initial
distribution prompted a second message to Congress recommending
the regulation of the operations of exchanges in order to protect
investors and eliminate speculation. 4 On June 6, 1934, Congress
enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Exchange Act
enabled the federal government, through the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, to combat the deceit, misrepresentation, and
other fraudulent acts and practices which existed in the trading
of listed securities for public sale.
The adoption of SEC statutes resulted in a double standard: 6
the regulation of over-the-counter markets was much less pervasive
and exacting than in the case of the major exchanges. 7 This double
standard persisted despite the fact that the opinion in Congress
was that over-the-counter companies should comply with the same
1 I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of
traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sus-
tained severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on
the part of many persons and corporations selling securities . ..
There is however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue
of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be ac-
companied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the
buying public ...
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933) ; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933).
2 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1958).
3 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 130 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited Loss].
4 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958).
6 2 Loss 1149.
7 The lag in regulation of over-the-counter markets may have been due
partly to lack of information. The flow of information regarding activities
in the exchange markets did not exist in over-the-counter markets. The
number of broker-dealers participating in the over-the-counter markets
and the number and type of issues traded in these markets was unknown.
The volume of trading, size, price, and timing of individual transactions
regarding over-the-counter securities were all unknown at any given time.
The lack of information about over-the-counter markets was compounded
by the lack of information regarding issuers of over-the-counter securities.
REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISION, H. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 2 at 542
(1963) [hereinafter cited SPECIAL STUDY].
rules, regulations, and statutory provisions as companies whose
stocks were listed on a national securities exchange.s
In 1963 the SEC issued to Congress the Report of Special Study
of Securities Markets (hereinafter referred to as the Special Study)
which served to point up the need for closer regulation of the over-
the-counter markets. Over-the-counter sales of corporate securities
increased from $4.9 billion in 1949 to $38.9 billion in 1961-an
increase of almost 800% in twelve years. As a percentage of total
exchange sales, over-the-counter sales increased from 37% to 61.%
between 1955 and 1961. The securities traded over-the-counter
are diverse in kind, price, quality, and activity; 10 and due to the
virtually free access of persons into the over-the-counter securities
s In 1955 the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency noted the wide
disparity between protection afforded over-the-counter investors and in-
vestors in the exchange markets by the following statement. "The com-
mittee is of the view that as a general policy, it is in the public interest
that companies whose stocks are traded over-the-counter be required to
comply with the same statutory provisions and the same rules and regu-
lations as companies whose stocks are listed on national securities ex-
changes." (Italics in original.) S. REP. No. 376, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1953) ; quoted in S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963).
9 SPECIAL STUDY Pt. 2 at 546-47.
0 Id. at 547-48.
PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE SERVICE TO MEMBERS OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION: FOR 25 YEARS
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-/Accidental Death, Dismemberment and Permanent Dis-
ability up to $100,000 for member and wife.
-/Family Major (Catastrophy) Medical Expense, up to
$10,000 for member and $10,000 for each dependent.
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the Colorado Bar Association for its members.
/The group purchasing power of your membership results
in a substantial savings to you.
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business there is a similar diversity of broker-dealer participants.1
Issuers of over-the-counter securities vary considerably in asset
size, shares outstanding, and number of stockholders. 1 2 Absence
of a tape to report and publicize over-the-counter transactions in-
creases the possibilities of a high pressure selling effort. Finally,
the markup on over-the-counter securities is not disclosed to in-
vestors, and prices quoted to the public differ from the prices
quoted other broker-dealers.
13
The purpose of this Note is to sketch the evolution of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 through the interaction of
Congress with the Securities and Exchange Commission and to
indicate the effect of the new amendments on issuers whose securi-
ties are traded over-the-counter.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As early as 1938 the board of governors of the New York Stock
Exchange recognized a need for extending reporting and disclosure
requirements of the Exchange Act to major companies with widely
held distributed securities.' 4 The Commission responded with a
study "of the mechanisms whereby the investing public may most
easily be afforded the protection of corporate information, proxy
regulation, and the prevention of speculation by corporate 'insiders'
with respect to all securities which enjoy an interstate trading
market."
5
In 1941 the New York and American Stock Exchanges recom-
mended that Sections 1416 and 1617 be extended to all issuers with
$3 million in assets and 300 stockholders which were engaged in
interstate commerce or whose securities were dealt in by use of
the mails or other interstate facilities.'8
After a study of companies whose shares were not registered
11 Id. at 548-51.
12 A sample of 1,618 companies whose securities were traded exclusively
over-the-counter at the end of 1961 showed 31% had assets in excess of
$10 million, 47% had assets in excess of $5 million, and 77% had assets
in excess of $1 million. Approximately half the issuers had less than
200,000 shares outstanding. Approximately half the companies had 500
or more stockholders, and 16% had 2000 or more. The total market value
of stocks outstanding ranged from 20% with $10 million or over to 60%
with $1 million or over. In addition, the median price of the securities in
the sample was substantially below the median price of securities traded
on the New York Stock Exchange at the end of 1961. SPECIAL STUDY Pt. 2
at 551.
13 Id. at 552-53.
14 2 Loss 1152.
155 SEC ANN. REP. 57 (1939).
'6 Relating to proxy solicitation.
17 Relating to insider reporting and trading.
Is 2 Loss 1152.
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under the Exchange Act, the Commission in 1946 proposed that
the registration and reporting provisions of Sections 12 and 13
and the proxy and insider trading provisions of Sections 14 and 16
be made applicable to issuers having both $3 million in assets and
300 security holders-without limitation to stockholders. A new
section would have required every issuer engaged in, or in business
affecting, interstate commerce, or whose securities were traded by
any means of interstate commerce, to file the registration statement
and reports required by Sections 12 and 13.111 The 1946 proposal
was incorporated into a bill2 l by Representative Lea of California,
but the session closed before any action could be taken by Con-
gress.
21
Senator Frear, chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee, in 1949 introduced a bill identical to the 1946
proposal,'22 but it was never reported out of committee..2 3 Senator
Frear met with similar success when he reintroduced the bill in
1951.24
On May 26, 1955, the Banking and Currency Committee recom-
mended that companies whose securities are traded over-the-
counter be treated the same as companies whose securities are
listed on a national securities exchange.2 1 Two days earlier Senator
Fulbright, then chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee,
introduced a bill similar to Senator Frear's ill-fated ones.2 ' The
Commission reacted without enthusiasm. It suggested some of the
provisions receive further study. 7 and proposed several amend-
ments to the bill.
2 s
An amended bill2 was endorsed by the Commission in a 1956
'" SEC, Poposal to Safeguard Investors in Unregistered Securities, H.R.
Doc. No. 672, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1946).
2(1 H.R. 7151, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
21 S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963).
22 S. 2408, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949). See Comment, The Frear Bill: Exten-
sion of Investor Protection to Unlisted Securities, 45 ILL. L. REV. 263
(1950); Bayne, Around and Beyond the SEC-The Disenfranchised Stock-
holder, 26 IND. L. J. 207, 222-29 (1951).
23 96 CONG. REC. 15, 109 (1950).
24 S. 1860, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
25 See note 8 supra.
26 S. 2054, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The standards of Senator Fulbright's
bill were set at $5 million of assets and 500 security holders.
27 Hearings on S. 2054 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, Pt. 2, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1037-62 (1955).
I 1Sd. at 1067-70. One of the Commission's suggestions was that the only
criterion necessary for coverage of equity securities was 750 record
holders. No asset test was believed necessary.
29 All the standards and proposals of the Commission were met except two:
a $2 million asset test and a provision for deregistration when assets fell
below $1 million were retained. Hearings on S. 2054, supra note 27 at 1024.
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report 30 subject to certain reservations regarding Sections 16 (b)
and 15 (d).31 After further hearings the Senate Banking Committee
reported the bill out in July, 1957,32 but the Senate never voted on
the bill.
30 The Commission brought up to date reports made in 1946 and 1950. Report
of SEC on S. 2054 (Comm. Print 1956).
31 The Commission noted the problem of sponsorship of security issues in
the over-the-counter market by broker-dealers who also were on the
issuer's board of directors. Additional time was requested to determine
whether the profit recapture provisions of Section 16(b) should apply to
such sponsors.
32 For a general background of this bill see Note, The Futlbright Bill: Exten-
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In 1961 Congress directed the SEC to study the adequacy of
existing laws and regulations for protection of investors. The
Special Study report, made in 1963, formed the basis for bills
which ultimately became the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964. 33 The Special Study concluded a balance of theoretical and
practical considerations was necessary to determine to what issuers
the requirements of Sections 13, 14, and 16 should be extended. 4
Theoretically, all securities in which a public investor interest
exists ought to be included.35 Practically speaking this is impossi-
ble. Although several determinants of coverage were considered
important,3 6 the Special Study Group did not feel an asset test
was necessary or appropriate.37 The criterion for coverage finally
adopted, however, was a double test: $1 million in assets, and a
showing, after two years, of 500 or more stockholders.3 8
III. REGISTRATION EXTENDED UNDER SECTION 12 (g) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
The principal change in existing law made by the 1964 Amend-
ments was the addition of Section 12 (g) to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Section 12 (g) provides for the registration of certain
securities traded over-the-counter and subjects the issuers to dis-
33 H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, and S. 1642, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963).
'4 The standards of coverage had to be 1) reasonably reliable; 2) easily
enforceable; 3) sufficiently important to the public interest to warrant
the regulatory burden assumed by the government; and 4) significant in
view of the burden of compliance imposed upon the issuers involved.
35 Under the Ralston Purina case this is not necessarily a matter of
large numbers; at least for Securities Acts purposes, an offering to a
very small number of persons may be 'public' if they need the protec-
tion of disclosure, and by parity of reasoning, it may be argued that
any company with outside stockholders, however few, should be in-
cluded in the protective legislation. Presumably on this reasoning,
at least one past legislative proposal has used standards of 10 stock-
holders and $500,000 of assets. Congress has fixed 100 shareholders
as the standard of coverage under the Investment Company Act.
SPECIAL STUDY, Pt. 3 at 17. See Securities Exchange Commission v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) ; H.R. 7955, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952);
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c) (1), 54 Stat. 797, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-3(c) (1) (1958).
36 The characteristics most important as determinants of coverage were:
1) number of shareholders; 2) amount of assets; 3) transfers of stock;
4) concentration of holdings; and 5) trading interest in inter-dealer
markets.
37 SPECIAL STUDY, Pt. 3 at 34.
38 Inclusion of the $1 million asset test removed about 17% of all companies
at the 500 or more shareholder level and about 13% at the 750 or more
shareholder level from coverage of the new amendments. The justification
for inclusion of an asset test is twofold: 1) the administrative burden on
the Commission is significantly reduced, and 2) the larger companies are
better able to bear the burden of compliance than smaller ones. Id. at 33.
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closure requirements comparable to those for securities registered
on a national exchange.3 9
Several factors must exist at the end of the issuer's fiscal year
before registration is compulsory. 40 Either the issuer's securities
must be traded by use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or
the issuer must be engaged in, or in a business affecting, interstate
commerce. "Total assets" must be in excess of $1 million and a
"class" of "equity security" (other than an exempted security) must
exist. Finally, the class of equity security must be "held of record"
by 750 persons initially and after July 1, 1966, by some 500 persons.4'
A. Definition of Terms
Section 12 (g) (1) uses the terms "class," "equity security,"
"held of record," and "total assets" in extending protection to pur-
chasers and sellers of over-the-counter securities. It is important
that the meaning of these terms-as intended by the Commission
and Congress-coincide with the interpretation attached to them
subsequent to enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments into
law.
1. "Class"
Section 12 (g) (5) states that "the term 'class' shall include all
securities of an issuer which are of substantially similar character
and the holders of which enjoy substantially similar rights and
privileges."
42
Section 12 (g) applies only to issuers which have "a class of
equity security . . . held of record by 75041 persons. 4 4 Conse-
quently it would seem that an issuer might evade being subject
' See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 48 Stat. 892, 15 U.S.C.
781 (b) (1958).
40 If the issuer, directly or indirectly, affects interstate commerce, a registra-
tion statement must be filed with the Commission:
(A) within one hundred and twenty days after the last day of its
first fiscal year ended after the effective date of this subsection on
which the issuer has total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of
equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by
seven hundred and fifty or more persons; and
(B) within one hundred and twenty days after the last day of its
first fiscal year ended after two years from the effective date of this
section on which the issuer has total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and
a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of
record by five hundred or more but less than seven hundred and fifty
persons . ...
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (1), added by 78 Stat. 566-67
(1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (1) (Supp. 1964).
41 The Special Study recommended a phased approach which would ultimately
reach issuers with 300 stockholders or more. SPECIAL STUDY, Pt. 3 at 62.
42 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12 (g) (5), added by 78 Stat. 568 (1964),
15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (5) (Supp. 1964).
43 Five hundred persons after July 1, 1966.
44Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (1), added by 78 Stat. 566-67
(1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (1) (Supp. 1964).
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to registration by varying the characteristics of different series
of securities. The issuer must be sure that the differences in fact
constitute separate classes. An example of the difficulties which
can result is provided by a case arising under Section 16(b) of
the Exchange Act. 45 In Ellerin v. Massachussetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co.46 the corporation had issued two series of cumulative pre-
ferred stock fourteen months apart. The defendant owned more
than 10% of the smaller series issued, but not more than 10% of
the two series combined. Although the series had different dividend
rates, redemption prices, and sinking fund provisions, the court
found that the similarities outweighed the differences; there was
but a single "class" of securities.
47
2. "Equity Security"
There are two main sources from which a corporation expands
its assets-capital contributions by shareholders, and loans to the
corporation by creditors. Capital contributions are usually evi-
denced by a certificate representing the amount of proprietary
interest each shareholder has in the corporation. These certificates
are equity securities. Section 3 (a) (11) of the Exchange Act defines
equity security as "any stock or similar security; or any security
convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security;
or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such
a security; or any such warrant or right ... ,
Voting trust certificates and certificates of deposit are equity
securities only if the underlying securities are equity securities.4 9
4.1 Applicability of Section 16 (b) stemmed from this portion of Section 16 (a) :
"Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security .... ... " must
comply with the insider reporting provision. Id. § 16(a), 78 Stat. 579
(1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a) (Supp. 1964).
46270 F.2d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1959), 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 625 (1959), 12 VAND.
L. REV. 928 (1959).
47 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15 (1961).
48 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (11), 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a) (11) (1958).
49 SEC Rule 16a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1964).
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In 1953 treasury stock was determined to be an equity security.50
Since any security which is convertible into an equity security is
itelf an equity security, 1 bonds which are convertible into pre-
ferred or common stock are equity securities and warrants or rights
to purchase equity securities are also equity securities. Professor
Loss points out that presumably a warrant to subscribe to a
convertible bond would also be considered an equity security
though twice removed from the equity security itself.
5 2
To preclude the necessity of registration, a corporation might
issue bonds rather than equity securities to expand its assets. A
company seeking more capital with a choice of issuing bonds or
equity securities might choose the former source if the ratio of
debt to equity is not already overbalanced. " 3
3. "Held of Record"
It is difficult for issuers to ascertain the number of beneficial
owners of securities held by broker-dealers in street name, by
banks, or by other nominees. In most cases stock transfer records
provide the only means of determining the number of record
holders. 54 Consequently the Commission promulgated5 5 rule 12g
5-1 to provide uniform guidelines for the determination of the
number of record holders:5 6 each person who would be identified
as the owner of the security on records which are maintained
according to accepted practices is a separate holder. When securi-
ties are held of record by a corporation, partnership, trust or other
organization, or by one or more fiduciaries for a single trust, estate,
or account, a single record holder exists. Securities held of record
by two or more persons as co-owners are treated as if one record
holder exists. Outstanding unregistered or bearer certificates are
each deemed to be held of record by one person unless the issuer
can establish that, if registered, the certificates would be held of
record by a lesser number of persons. If the issuer has reason to
believe, because of the address or other indications, substantially
50 Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1953).
sl SEC Securities Act Release No. 4725 and Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7425 (September 15, 1964) at 5 [hereinafter cited SEC Release No.
4725 and 7425].
522 Loss 1095.
53 A substantial amount of debt necessarily involves more risk, because both
the payment of interest and the amortization or repayment of principal
are contractual obligations which must be met if bankruptcy is to be
avoided." WESSEL, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 47 (1961).
54 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 905, Pt. I at 77 (June 20, 1963).
Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Com-
mission has the power to "define technical, trade, and accounting terms
used in this title insofar as such definitions are not inconsistent with the
provision of this title."
56 SEC Rule 12g5-1, 30 Fed. Reg. 483 (1965).
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similar names on separate certificates represent the same person,
only one person will be included as holding the security of record.
When the issuer knows securities are held subject to a voting trust,
deposit agreement, or a similar arrangement, the securities are in-
cluded as held of record by the record holders of the certificates
or other evidences of interest issued under such arrangement.
Fractional securities issued by certain institutions in order to
qualify a borrower for membership in the issuer, which will be
redeemed or repurchased by the issuer when the loan is terminated,
shall not be included as held of record by any person. Finally, if
an issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of holding
securities of record is intended to circumvent the provisions of
the act, the beneficial owners of such securities shall be deemed
the record holders.
4. "Total Assets"
The valuation methods used by some companies regarding
their assets vary widely. Because certain issuers may attempt to
devalue their assets arbitrarily, the administration of a statutory
standard-through application of generally accepted accounting
principles-assists in preventing circumvention of the statute and
assures uniformity in the coverage extended. The Commission has
provided such a standard in rule 12g5-2:
For the purpose of Section 12 (g) (1) of the Act, the
term "total assets" shall mean the total assets as shown on
the issuer's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the issuer
and its subsidiaries consolidated, whichever is larger, as
required to be filed on the form prescribed for registration
under this section and prepared in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of Regulation S-X. Where the security
is a certificate of deposit, voting trust certificate, or cer-
tificate or other evidence of interest in a similar trust or
agreement, the "total assets" of the issuer of the security
held under the trust or agreement shall be deemed to be
the "total assets" of the issuer of such certificate or evi-
dence of interest.5
7
B. When Registration Becomes Effective
The registration statement must be filed within 120 days after
the last day of the first fiscal year in which the issuer first meets
the statutory tests.5 s The registration statement does not become
57 SEC Rule 12g5-2, 30 Fed. Reg. 483 (1965).
58 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (1) (A). added by 78 Stat. 566-
67 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (1) (A) (Supp. 1964).
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effective until 60 days after filing, but the Commission may direct
that it become effective within a shorter period. The Commission
may also direct that any issuer or class of issuers be granted a time
extension regarding registration. Until the effective date of the
registration statement, the civil liability sanctions of Section 18
of the Exchange Act59 do not apply to the issuer.
C. Information Required in Registration Statements
The Commission may require information comparable to that
required in an application to register on a national securities
exchange 60 in respect of the following: 1) the organization, finan-
cial structure, and nature of the business; 2) the terms, positions,
rights, and privileges of the different classes of securities out-
standing; 3) holdings and remuneration of officers, directors,
underwriters, and major stockholders and their material contracts
with the issuer; 4) remuneration of highly compensated employees;
5) bonus and profit sharing arrangements including stock options;
6) material contracts not made in the ordinary course of business;
7) balance sheets; 8) profit and loss statements; and 9) other
financial statements required by the Commission.6 1
The balance sheet and statements of profit and loss and surplus
for the preceding three fiscal years must be certified by an inde-
pendent public accountant. Generally, an accountant will not be
deemed independent if, during the period covered by his certifica-
tion, he had a direct or material indirect financial interest in the
issuer, its parent, or its subsidiaries.0 2
5) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r (1958).
60 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (1), added by 78 Stat. 566-67
(1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (1) (Supp. 1964).
61 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b) (1), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 781(B) (1) (1958). Registration must be made on Form 10, 30
Fed. Reg. 3422 (1965).
62 See SEC Release No. 4725 and 7425; SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210 (1950).
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D. Termination of Registration
Paragraph (4) of Section 12 (g) provides for the termination
of registration after the issuer files a certification with the Com-
mission stating that the number of stockholders is less than 300
persons.6 3 Registration is terminated ninety days, "or such shorter
period as the Commission may determine," after filing of the certi-
fication.
6 4
Issuers with securities registered pursuant to Section 12 (g)
of the Exchange Act continue to be subject to other provisions of
the Exchange Act-Sections 13, 14, and 16-until registration
terminates for each class of the issuer's registered equity securi-
ties. If, on the last day of any fiscal year, after termination of
registration, any class of equity security is held of record by the
required number of stockholders and the issuer has assets exceed-
ing one million dollars, the class of equity securities will be sub-
ject to registration.6
E. Exemptions From Registration
1. Foreign Securities
The authority to exempt foreign securities from registration
was vested in the Commission by Section 12(g) (3) whenever
"such exemption is in the public interest and is consistent with
the protection of investors. ' 6 Accordingly the Commission promul-
gated rule 12g3-1, 67 exempting from registration securities of
foreign issuers until November 30, 1965, to give the Commission
time to study the problems involved in the coverage of foreign
securities.6"
However, the Commission believes that to the extent practic-
able, American investors in foreign securities should be afforded
the same protections to which American investors in domestic
securities are now entitled.6 ' Therefore it would be reasonable to
63 "Registrations will not alternately terminate and become reinstated be-
cause a security hovers above and below the 500 or 750 shareholder mark."
CCH, SECURITIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF 1964 WITH EXPLANATION 11 (1964).
64 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (4) added by 78 Stat. 568 (1964),
15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (4) (Supp. 1964).
65 SEC Release No. 4725 and 7425 at 7.
66 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (3), added by 78 Stat. 568 (1964),
15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (3) (Supp. 1964).
67 Securities issued by (i) any foreign government or political sub-
division thereof, (ii) any national of any foreign country, (iii) any
corporation organized under the laws of any foreign country, and
(iv) certificates of deposit, receipts or other evidences of interest re-
lating to any of the foregoing securities, shall be exempt from Section
12 (g) of the Act until November 30, 1965.
SEC Rule 12g3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-1 (1964).
6s SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7427 (1964) ; SEC Rules 12g3-1,
17 C.F.R. § 240.12-3-1 (1946).
69 Ibid.
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suppose the exemption currently extended to foreign securities
will not continue. On the other hand, the Commission expressly
exempts listed foreign securities from some of the provisions which
ordinarily follow in the wake of registration. Foreign issuers with
securities listed on an exchange are exempt (except for North
American companies) from filing current reports,70 semi-annual
reports, 71 and from the insider trading and proxy solicitation re-
quirements of the Exchange Act.7 2 Foreign issuers who are required
to register under the Securities Act but whose securities are not
traded on an exchange, are (except for North American companies)
exempt from filing current and semi-annual reports under Section
15 (d) of the Exchange Act. 7" The temporary exemption will pro-
vide the Commission with time to develop rules to determine the
extent to which various foreign issuers and their insiders will be
subject to the new amendments.
2. Insurance Companies
The traditional regulation of insurance companies by the states
precludes the necessity for compliance with the requirements of
the Exchange Act. The new law provides insurance companies with
an exemption from the registration requirements of the act which,
however, is conditioned on specified state regulation of insurance
companies.
74
70 SEC Rule 13a-11 (b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-ll (1964), 17 C.F.R. § 249.220
(1964).
71 SEC Rule 13a-13(c) (7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13(c) (7) (1964).
72 SEC Rule 3a12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 2 40.3a12-3 (1964).
78 SEC Rule 15d-11(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-11(b) (1964); SEC Rule 15d-
13(c) (7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-13(c) (7) (196)).
74 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (2) (G), added by 78 Stat. 567-
68 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (2) (G) (Supp. 1964), is as follows:
(2) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply in respect of --
(G) any security issued by an insurance company if all of the
following conditions are met:
(i) Such insurance company is required to and does file
an annual statement with the Commissioner of Insurance (or
other officer or agency performing a similar function) of its
domiciliary State, and such annual statement conforms to that
prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners or in the determination of such State commissioner,
officer or agency substantially conforms to that so prescribed.
(ii) Such insurance company is subject to regulation by
its domiciliary State of proxies, consents, or authorizations in
respect of securities issued by such company and such regu-
lation conforms to that prescribed by the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners.
(iii) After July 1, 1966, the purchase and sales of secu-
rities issued by such insurance company by beneficial owners,
directors, or officers of such company are subject to regulation
(including reporting) by its domiciliary state substantially
in the manner provided by section 78p of this title.
The two year postponement of the third requirement provides state legis-
latures with time to draft regulatory statutes regarding insider trading.
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3. Banks
Section 12(g) applies to securities issued by banks whose
deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
However, administration of the registration, periodic reporting,
proxy solicitation, and insider trading provisions of the Exchange
Act is vested not in the Commission but in three regulatory
agencies. The Comptroller of the Currency will deal with securities
issued by National and District of Columbia Banks, the Board of
Governers of the Federal Reserve System with state banks which
are members of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation will deal with all other insured
banks.7 5  Banks not subject to administration by one of the fore-
going federal bank regulatory agencies will be required to comply
with the provisions of Sections 12, 13, 14 and 16 as administered
by the Commission.
4. Other Exemptions
Registration is not required under Section 12(g) when the
following types of over-the-counter securities are involved: 76 1)
75 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(i), added by 78 Stat. 569 (1964),
15 U.S.C.A. § 781(i) (Supp. 1964).
76 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (2), added by 78 Stat. 569
(1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (2) (Supp. 1964).
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any security which is listed and registered on a national securities
exchange; 2) securities issued by investment companies registered
under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940; 7 7 3)
securities (other than stock generally representing non-withdraw-
able capital) of savings and loan associations and similar institu-
tions; 4) securities issued by charitable organizations which pay
none of their net earnings to private shareholders or individuals;
5) securities issued by a "cooperative association" as defined in
the Agricultural Marketing Act of 192978 or by a federation of such
cooperative associations; 6) securities of certain non-profit mutual
or cooperative organizations which supply a commodity or service
primarily to members; and 7) obligations of, or obligations guaran-
teed by, the United States, a state, or a political subdivision of a
state.71) A separate registration of listed securities is obviously un-
necessary since they are already subject to the same requirements
as those of the new law. By the same token, investment companies
subject to the Investment Company Act must meet comparable
requirements.8 o
The exemption for charitable issuers, as recommended by the
Special Study, and of savings and loan associations and similar
groups, was included as there is normally no trading interest in
their securities."' The exemption of federal, state, and municipal
obligations carries over from the previous act, as recommended
by the Special Study.
s2
In accordance with a Commission recommendation made after
hearing testimony on the new bill, Congress added a statutory
exemption for securities of cooperative associations.13 Two types
are exempted: 4 cooperatives, as defined in the Agriculture Market-
ing Act of 1929,85 and certain other cooperatives, particularly rural
electrification cooperatives. The exemption arose because these
securities represent a limited interest-merely a voting right. They
are nontransferable"o and the holder receives no dividend. 7
77 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1958).
7846 Stat. 11 (1949), 12 U.S.C. § 1141 (1958).
71) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (12), 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a) (12) (1958).
80 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1958).
81 S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1963).
82 SPECIAL STUDY, Pt. 3 at 63.
83 H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964).
84 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g) (2) (E) & (F), adde dby 78 Stat.
569 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (2) (E) & (F) (Supp. 1964).
8546 Stat. 11 (1929), 12 U.S.C. § 1141 (1958).
86 I.e., nontransferable except to successors in interest or occupancy of the
premises serviced by the cooperative. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
12(g) (2) (F), added by 78 Stat. 569 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 1 (g) (2) (F)
(Supp. 1964).
s H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964).
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The Commission has power to exempt issuers of securities from
all or part of the provisions relating to registration of over-the-
counter securities, periodic reporting, and proxy solicitation. Offi-
cers, directors, or stockholders of the issuer may also be exempted
from the insider trading provisions of Section 16 of the Exchange
Act. The Commission has the authority to classify issuers and pre-
scribe different exemptions and requirements for different classes.88
The number of stockholders, asset size, nature and extent of the
business activities, income, and trading interest in the securities
constitute appropriate bases for classification."
IV. IMPACT OF SECTION 12 (g) UPON REPORTING, PROXY SOLICITATION
AND INSIDER TRADING PROVISIONS.
Once a stock is registered, the issuer is subjected to other forms
of supervision by the Commission. Periodic reports are necessary,
the rules for proxy solicitation must be followed, and the corpora-
tion's officers, directors, and 10% stockholders are subject to the
provisions of insider trading. Registration ultimately demands
far more than appears on the surface.
A. Periodic Reports
Prior to the new amendments only issuers of securities regist-
ered on a national securities exchange were required to file the
periodic and other reports required by Section 13 of the Exchange
Act. ) Amended Section 13 now requires reports of "every issuer
of a security registered pursuant to section 12 of this title."9' 1
Furthermore, many issuers who are not required to register under
Section 12, either because the asset and stockholder requirements
are not met92 or because the type of security does not necessitate
registration,9' are nevertheless subjected to the reporting require-
ments of Section 13 by the provisions of amended Section 15 (d)..4
's Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(h), added by 78 Stat. 568 (1964),
15 U.S.C.A. § 781(h) (Supp. 1964).
S, Ibid.
90 "Every issuer of a security registered on a national securities exchange
shall file the information, documents, and reports below specified .... .
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 48 Stat. 894, 15 U.S.C. §
78m (a) (1958).
The documents which must be filed include current reports with respect
to major events such as changes in the amount of securities outstanding
and revaluation of assets (Form 8-K), semi-annual reports on operations
(Form 9-K) and comprehensive annual reports and financial statements
(Form 10-K).
I d. § 13(a), added by 78 Stat. 569 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(a) (Supp.
1964).
92 See note 40 supra.
93 Section 12 (g) applies only to equity securities.
94 See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-69 (1963).
1964 NOTE
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
Under the latter section, each issuer who files a registration state-
ment which becomes effective pursuant to the Securities Act of
1933 is required to file the reports required by Section 13 of the
Exchange Act95
B. Proxy Solicitation
The 1964 amendments have broadened the authority of the
Commission over proxy solicitations. Formerly it was unlawful
for any person to use the mails or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce to solicit proxies in respect of securities registered on
any national securities exchange "in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest for the protection of investors."96
The new law extends the SEC's rulemaking authority to proxies
solicited in respect of any security registered pursuant to Section
12.97
Under Section 15 an issuer is required to file periodic reports regardless
of the kind of security for which a registration statement is filed. If how-
ever, on the first day of any fiscal year, other than the fiscal year in
which the registration becomes effective, the securities in the class to
which the registration relates are held by less than 300 persons, the
filing of reports is not necessary. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
15(d), 78 Stat. 574 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (Supp. 1964).
906 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a)
(1958).
9
7 Id., as amended 78 Stat. 569 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(a) (Supp. 1964).
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Section 14 (b) has not only been extended to include securities
registered under Section 15,9s but has also been amended to close
a significant gap in its coverage.)1) According to a 1959 survey by
the New York Stock Exchange, 8% of all securities owned by public
investors were held in "street name" by brokers or dealers. 00
Under the theory that beneficial owners of these securities should
determine whether and to whom proxies should be given, Section
14(b) provided that proxies could be given by the broker-dealer
only in accordance with rules prescribed by the SEC. Unfortun-
ately it failed to give the Commission power to require broker-
dealers to transmit solicitation material to the beneficial owners of
securities held in street name, and to give proxies in accordance
with the directions of such owners. Since the broker-dealers could
therefore avoid any SEC rules merely by failing to give proxies,
no rules were ever promulgated.
The amended Section 14(b) gives the Commission the needed
authority to adopt rules under which registered broker-dealers
could not refrain from giving proxies with respect to securities
held by them for the account of customers. This amendment will
of course have no effect until the Commission has adopted imple-
menting rules and regulations. 1 1
SEC rules promulgated pursuant to Section 14(a) require the
disclosure of considerable information regarding the issues in all
proxy statements covered by that section,'0 ' but such disclosure
can be avoided by the simple expedient of not soliciting proxies.
1 3
Although the New York and American Stock Exchanges require
all listed companies to agree to solicit proxies for all meetings
of shareholders,'10 4 the same requirements have not applied to un-
listed companies or companies listed on other exchanges. 10 5 Sec-
tion 14(c), added to the Exchange Act by the 1964 amendments,
requires an issuer who does not solicit proxies to send to holders
of securities-registered and listed on a national exchange or regis-
tered pursuant to Section 12 (g) of the Exchange Act-substantially
the same information required of issuers soliciting proxies.
10 6
98 S. REP. No. 379 at 23-24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
99 Ibid.
100 CCH, SECURITIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF 1964 WITH EXPLANATION 16
(1964).
101 SEC Release No. 4725 and 7425 at 9.
102 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to § 240.14a-11 (1964).
103 S. REP. No. 379 at 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
104 See LISTING AGREEMENT, Part III, Item 5 and LISTING FORM L, Item 5,
American Stock Exchange Guide 8955; NYSE LISTING AGREEMENT, New
York Stock Exchange Company Manual A-28.
105 Supra note 92.
106 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(c), added by 78 Stat. 570 (1964),
15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(c) (Supp. 1964).
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Issuers will not be subject to this requirement until the Commis-
sion has implemented the provision by rules and regulations.'
0 7
Such a regulation has been proposed and is presently being con-
sidered by the Commission. l s
C. Insider Trading
Section 16109 embodies three separate, closely integrated pro-
visions to discourage the abuse of inside information. Section 16 (a)
requires officers, directors, and over-10 % -stockholders ("insiders")
to disclose the amount of, and any change in, their holdings in the
equity securities of the issuer. Section 16 (b) provides for recovery
by the issuer of any "short-swing" profits ' made by insiders trad-
ing in the issuer's equity securities. Section 16 (c) makes it unlaw-
ful for insiders to engage in short sales or "sales against the box.""'
The 1964 amendments extended the protection of Section 16
to investors in any security registered under Section 12. They also
added a specific exemption from the short-swing profit and short
sale (but not the disclosure) provisions of Section 16 in favor of
a broker-dealer who is making a market for the security in the
ordinary course of his business.
1 2
This exemption was adopted in spite of a contrary recom-
mendation by the Special Study. The Special Study recognized that
a problem exists when a broker-dealer is a corporate director while
making a market for the corporation's securities.
Where a broker-dealer has inside information through
a directorship, there may be a violation of obligation to the
corporation and its stockholders if the information is used,
and, at least in some circumstances, there may be a viola-
tion to customers if it is not used, especially if the custom-
ers have been led to rely on the protection flowing from
his close affiliation with the corporation.
113
Those in favor of maintaining the broker-dealer's dual role pro-
posed an exemption for two reasons. First, the presence of a
107 SEC Release No. 4725 and 7425 at 9.
lOS Proposed SEC Reg. 14C, 30 Fed. Reg. 711 (1965).
109 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (1958), as amended 78 Stat. 579 (1964), 16 U.S.C.A. § 78p (Supp.
1964).
110 Any profit realized from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
of any equity security of the issuer within any period of less than six
months is a "short swing" profit.
111 A "sale against the box" is a device whereby the record owner of shares
sells his holdings but fails to deliver the stock certificates to the buyer
within a reasonable time. The seller's change of position thus does not
become known until a later date.
112 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(d), 78 Stat. 579 (1964), 15 U.S.C.A.
78p(d) (Supp. 1964).
113 SPECIAL STUDY, Pt. 5 at 64.
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broker-dealer on the board helps protect customers who purchase
the issue. Second, because of his experience, he is able to provide
guidance to inexperienced companies regarding matters of financial
and shareholder relations. 114 Opponents to the exemption stated
that a director is a fiduciary and consequently cannot use inside
information for his own benefit. Furthermore, because the central
purpose of Section 16 is to enforce fiduciary obligations of directors,
officers, and 10% owners, the provision of an exemption vitiates
the protection afforded by Section 16.11"
The Special Study felt the problem had been greatly exagger-
ated:
Only a small segment of all over-the-counter issuers are
involved; many broker-dealers, if faced with the choice
of resigning as director or abandoning a trading market,
would doubtless choose to resign rather than cease trading;
and except in a very rare case it is difficult to conceive of
114 Id. Pt. 3 at 43.
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any individual's indispensability as both director and
market maker.116
The Special Study recommended no exemption, but instead advised
that the Commission be empowered to provide limited exemptions
on an affirmative showing of unique need of the issuer and
necessity or appropriateness for the public interest.117 It was felt
that disclosure provisions of the new law would eliminate the lack
of information which existed and thereby remove the main reason
underwriters felt the need to remain on the boards of companies
whose securities were not listed.
Despite the recommendation of the Special Study, Congress
adopted the exemption as proposed by the SEC. The exemption is
available only for purchases and sales made by the dealer in
the ordinary course of business and incident to establishment of
a primary or secondary market for the securities other than on an
exchange. The exemption is not available for transactions in securi-
ties which are, or at any time have been, held by the dealer in a
segregated investment account. The Commission may define and
prescribe the terms and conditions such as "held in an investment
account" or "in the ordinary course of business" as it deems
necessary in the public interest.11s The exemption is limited to
transactions by dealers in securities for which they are making
an over-the-counter market; therefore, the dealer must indicate
his willingness to other brokers and dealers to buy and sell such
securities on a regular basis for his own account at the time of
the transaction.119 A dealer is generally regarded as making the
primary or principal market if other dealers and brokers, having
orders to buy or sell the security, look to him as the principal
source for execution of such orders. A transaction by a dealer
however, is not exempt if incident to a market established or
maintained by another dealer. But, if more than one dealer is
making the market at the same time, the market-making transac-
tions of all the dealers would be exempt. To determine whether
a dealer is a beneficial owner of more than 10% of a class of
registered security, the securities in both his trading and invest-
ment account would be counted.l2
-
It should be noted that Section 12(h) empowers the Commis-
sion to exempt in whole or in part any issuer or class of issuers
from the registration, reporting, and proxy provisions of Sections
116 Id. Pt. 3 at 62.
117Id. at 63-64.
I's SEC Release No. 4725 and 7425.
119 S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1963).
120 Ibid.
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12 (g), 13, 14, and 15 (d), and to exempt any person from the
insider trading provisions of Section 16. Thus, certain transactions
of broker-dealers which are deemed necessary, appropriate, and
in the public interest will be completely exempt from Sections
16(b) and (c).
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of S. 1642 into law makes available to the
Commission all the tools it considers necessary for adequate
investor protection. In the course of the hearings on H.R. 6793
the chairman of the Commission, William L. Cary, assured a House
committee that the enactment of S. 1642 into law would provide
the needed protection to investors. Mr. Staggers, chairman of the
committee, asked Chairman Cary the following question:
If this bill is considered favorably by the committee
and enacted by the Congress, with any amendments that
we might put into it, will you then have the tools which
you think are adequate for the protection of the American
investment public?
I want no slip-up on this. You have indicated in your
previous appearance time and time again that the Commis-
sion is not lacking power in the rulemaking field to do
most of the things that are necessary to protect the Ameri-
can investor. So I ask you again, with this bill, will you
have the tools that you need to give adequate protection to
the American investment public?
Chairman Cary replied:
Mr. Chairman, I would say we do. In other words, we
don't promise to do a perfect job, but we will do the best
job we know how and think we would have the powers.
12 1
The new amendments will have far-reaching effects in the
investment industry. While investors may feel more secure in
the choice of their investments, the enactment of the amendments
into law does not preclude the necessity of investigation on the
investor's part. It should be understood that the securities laws
were designed to facilitate informed investor analyses and careful
discriminating investment decisions by the investing public. The
investor-not the Commission-must make a judgment as to the
value of the worth of securities offered for sale. The new law
merely demands disclosure of information on which to base such
a judgment. The rest is up to the investor.
Elliott R. Husney
H.S. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1964).
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FUTURE INTERESTS-DEOLUTION OF A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
IN COLORADO. School Dist. No. Six v. Russell, 396 P.2d 929 (Colo.
1964).
".. . unto the said party of the second part [a school district]
its heirs and assigns forever . . .1
"It is understood and agreed that if the . .. land is abandoned
by the said second parties and not used for School purposes then
the . . . land reverts to the party of the first part."'
This inept language was aptly construed by the Supreme Court
of Colorado in an opinion which is noteworthy both for what is ex-
pressed and for what is necessarily to be inferred from the decision.
If the deed had said, "unto the said party of the second part
its heirs and assigns, so long as the land is used for school purposes,
and no longer, whereupon it shall revert to the party of the first
part and his heirs," the grantee would have had a fee simple with
a special limitation and the grantor would have had a possibility of
reverter.
3
If the deed had said, "unto the said party of the second part its
heirs and assigns, but if the land is abandoned by the said second
party and not used for school purposes then the party of the first
part and his heirs shall have the power to terminate the estate here-
by granted," the grantee would have had an estate in fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent, and the grantor would have had
a power of termination.
4
The actual deed was a hybrid. "If" is the language of condition;
"reverts" is the language of limitation. The court recognized this
difficulty, and avoided subjecting itself to the compulsion of words
that were so obviously inappropriate. Instead, it relied upon the
purpose of the grantor, and a sophisticated rule of construction
quoted from the American Law of Property:
If the purpose is to compel compliance with a condition
by the penalty of forfeiture, an estate on condition arises,
but if the intent is to give the land for a stated use, the es-
tate to cease when that use or purpose is ended, no penalty
for a breach of condition is involved, since the purpose is
not to enforce performance of a condition, but to convey
1 This portion of the deed was not quoted in the court's opinion but may be
found in the Brief of Plaintiff in Error, Appendix A, p. 1.
2 School Dist. No. Six v. Russell, 396 P.2d 929, 930 (Colo. 1964).
3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44 (1936).
4 Id. § 45.
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the property for so long as it is needed for the purpose for
which it is given and no longer. Therefore, in spite of lan-
guage of condition, if the prevailing purpose is to create a
collateral limitation of this kind, and not to enforce a con-
dition by a threatened forfeiture, a fee on limitation re-
sults."' 5
Under this rule the court determined that the deed had created "an
estate in fee simple determinable,"6 that is a fee simple with a spe-
cial limitation, and that the grantor had therefore retained a poss-
ibility of reverter, not a power of termination. The court did not
mention instances in which a contrary result would be reached un-
der this rule, but it would seem that the "liquor clause" cases would
be good examples.
Having thus classified the reversionary interest as a possibility
of reverter, the court took occasion to refer to its 1939 decision in
Union Colony Co. v. Gallie7 and to correct its "language which has
created confusion and uncertainty in the law with regard to the
problem here presented."'S This return to orthodoxy was not to have
been expected, because in 19631 the court quoted with apparent ap-
proval some of the confusing language in Union Colony Co. v.
Gallie.
What difference did it make in this case whether the reversion-
ary interest was a possibility of reverter or a power of termination?
The answer to this question is very important, but it must be in-
ferred. In 1942 the court had held"' that a one-year statute of limi-
396 P.2d at 931-32. The part of the opinion which includes this quotation did
not appear in the court's original opinion dated November 30, 1964. The
modified opinion of December 21, 1964, however, included the quoted para-
graph.
6 Ibid.
7 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939).
8 396 P.2d at 932.
1) Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 381 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1963).
10 Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 123 P.2d 412 (1942).
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tations" barred the assertion of a power of termination. Here, in
spite of the School District's contention that the statute was a bar,
and the admitted fact that more than a year had elapsed between
the cessation of use and the bringing of the action, the court sus-
tained the possibility of reverter. The necessary inference is that, as
such, it was not affected by the statute. This had never before been
decided. It is not here expressed, but there is no other way to ac-
count for the decision, and it explains the decisive importance of
the court's classification of the interest. If it had been a power of
termination it would have been barred by the statute; since it was
a possibility of reverter it was not barred. The result can of course
be justified by the fact that a possibility of reverter is automatic
and requires no act upon the part of the one who has it; a power of
termination must be asserted. The statute says, "No action shall be
commenced or maintained to recover . . .or to enforce . . .or to
compel .... 
12
This leaves for consideration what is perhaps the most interest-
ing part of the decision, namely, the devolution of the possibility of
reverter from the time of the grantor's death in 1930.
It was contended that a possibility of reverter was not "subject
to grant, devise or inheritance,"' r and that only those who would
have been the heirs of the grantor at the time of the happening of
the limiting event could represent him at that time and thereby
acquire the estate. The common law authority for this proposition
necessarily relates only to powers of termination upon breach of
conditions subsequent, because there is such a paucity of English
common law relating to possibilities of reverter that it has been
doubted that such an interest could have been created after the
statute of Quia Emptores, 1290.14
The court expressly rejected this argument and adopted the
rule that "the possibility of reverter is cast by descent upon the per-
son's heirs, at the time of his death.' 15 An attempt to apply any rule
other than that of the statute of descent and distribution16 might
11 COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 40, § 154 (now COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-8-4
(1963)).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-8-4 (1963).
13 396 P.2d at 930.
14 See, e.g., GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 32 (4th ed. 1942): "In
accordance with the doctrine of the foregoing section, no possibility of
reverter after a determinable fee has been sustained in England since the
Statute Quia Emptores."
15 396 P.2d at 932.
16 The applicable statute, COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 176, § 1, said, "Any
real estate or property having the nature or legal character of real estate
... shall descend .... " COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963) is the same.
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lead a court into consideration of such unfamiliar rules of descent
as those pertaining to primogeniture and ancestral lands.
The decision to apply the ordinary rules of descent to possibili-
ties of reverter was all that was said about the devolution of the in-
terest, and the problems of devise and inter vivos conveyance were
apparently left unanswered. However, the court did find that one
Mary Sander was the owner of the estate which had reverted. In
one place it is said that she is "the grantee in a deed from persons
who were the heirs and devisees of the said Agnes F. Russell"'1 7 who
was the sole heir of the grantor. In another place it is said "Mary
Sander secured a deed from persons who, through inheritance and
devise succeeded to the rights originally held by Russell [the
grantor] under the possibility of reverter created by him."s
It is impossible for the same interest to be acquired both by
inheritance and by devise, and whenever a testator appears to de-
vise property to a person who is his heir, it is necessary to consider
the applicability of the doctrine of worthier title in order to deter-
mine whether the person who took the property took as heir or as
devisee. The facts which are needed are, fortunately, included in
Appendix B of the Brief of Plaintiff in Error. It contains an ab-
struct of the chain of title from Herbert A. Russell, the original








17 396 P.2d at 930.
18 396 P.2d at 932.
Deed, Russell to School District.
Herbert A. Russell dies intestate, with widow,
Agnes F. Russell, as sole heir.
Agnes F. Russell dies testate, leaving a brother,
David M. Bell, and sister, Jane B. Darling, with
residue to Jane B. Darling.
Jane B. Darling dies testate leaving her residu-
ary estate to her heirs, Mort W. Darling (hus-
band), and children, Dewey L. Darling, Ray W.
Darling, and Satia May Turner.
Mort W. Darling dies testate with residuary
estate to his heirs, Dewey L. Darling, Ray W.
Darling, and Satia May Turner.
School discontinued at school site but posses-
sion retained by School District.
1964
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May 1, 1962 School District files complaint for quiet title.
Nov. 5, 1962 Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit Claim
Deed from David M. Bell, Dewey L. Darling,
Ray W. Darling, and Satia May Turner.
It is apparent that when the grantor, Herbert F. Russell, died
intestate on June 4, 1930, his possibility of reverter descended to
his only heir, his widow, Agnes F. Russell. When she died, on May
20, 1950, it is to be inferred that her only heirs were a brother and
a sister. It is further to be inferred, since the subsequent links in
the chain of title do not include the brother, that the possibility of
reverter was included in the residuary devise to the sister, Jane B.
Darling. Did she take it as a devisee or as an heir?
This depends upon whether the doctrine of worthier title is
applicable. In a case in which the doctrine was applied, the Su-
preme Court of Oregon quoted Blackstone's statement of the rule:
"But if a man ... devises his whole estate to his heir at law, so
that the heir takes neither a greater nor a less estate by the devise
than he would have done without it, he shall be adjudged to take
descent .... "19
The rule is applicable even though the heir is named, as in the
present case, "to my sister, Jane B. Darling." It has been stated that
the "test . . . is to strike out of the will the particular devise to the
heir, and then, if without that he would take by descent exactly the
same estate which the devise purports to give him, he is in by
descent .... "20
It might appear that in the present case the doctrine would not
be applicable because as heir, the sister would have taken only an
individed one-half interest in the possibility of reverter (the other
half going to her brother), whereas by the residuary clause she was
devised the entire interest. However, under the orthodox rule this
sort of difference would not prevent the application of the doc-
trine.
2 1
There is, though, another factor in this case which does pre-
vent the doctrine from being applicable. As an heir, she would have
inherited with her brother as a tenant in coparcenary, 22 but under
the will she took as tenant in severalty. This difference in tenure
19 Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 101 P.2d 414, 415 (1940).
20 Harper & Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 24 ILL. L. REV. 627,
635 (1930).
21 Id. at 642.
22 COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 176, § 1, the applicable statute on May 20,
1950, provided, "it shall descend . . . in parcenary . . . . " COLO. REV.
STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963) is the same.
VOL. XLI
COMMENTS
is enough to take the devise out of the doctrine of worthier title. 2 3
Therefore, Jane B. Darling took not as heir, but as devisee. Since
the title which was quieted in Mary Sander was derived from Jane
B. Darling, the decision of this case included, by necessary infer-
ence, the first decision that a possibility of reverter was devisable
in Colorado.
24
Nothing pertaining to the devolution of a possibility of reverter
would be gained by a further study of the chain of title. The first
transfer, on June 4, 1930, required a holding that a possibility of re-
verter was inheritable in the ordinary manner in Colorado, and this
was expressly stated by the court. The next transfer on May 20,
1950, necessarily involved a decision that a possibility of reverter
was devisable in Colorado. The decision left unanswered the ques-
tion as to whether a possibility of reverter could be conveyed by
deed in Colorado, because there was no such transfer in this chain
of title until November 5, 1962, after the estate had reverted.
Thompson G. Marsh*
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS-DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
-A BELIEF WHICH OCCUPIES A PLACE IN THE LIFE OF ITS POSSESSOR
PARALLEL TO THAT ORDINARILY FILLED BY AN ORTHODOX BELIEF IN
GOD IS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF. United States v. Seeger, 85 Sup. Ct.
850 (1965).
Daniel Seeger claimed exemption from military service as a
conscientious objector,1 but left open the question as to his belief
in a Supreme Being. He declared, however, that his agnostic phi-
losophy did "not necessarily mean lack of faith in a purely ethical
creed. ' '2 Although the government conceded that Seeger's abhor-
23 Harper & Heckel, supra note 20 at 639-640.
24 The applicable statute, COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 176, § 36, said, "
shall have the power to . . . devise . . . any or all the estate, right, title
and interest in possession, reversion or remainder . . . of, in and to any
lands, tenements, heriditaments, annuities or rents charged upon or issuing
out of them . . . . COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-1 (1963) says, . . . may
devise . . . real . . . property or any interest therein .... .
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1951) : Seeger's claim was made under § 6(j) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act:
Nothing contained in this title [§ § 451-454 and 455-471 of this Ap-
pendix] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious train-
ing and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.
2 85 Sup. Ct. at 854.
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rence of war was both sincere and predicated on "religious training
and belief,' 3 the selective service board denied his claim solely on
the grounds that it was not based upon a "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being" as required by § 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act.' Seeger was convicted in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to
submit to induction in the armed forces. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the
Supreme Being requirement of the act violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment by creating an impermissible class-
ification between internally derived and externally compelled
"religious" beliefs. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching
the constitutional issue, holding that "the test of belief 'in a rela-
tion to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qual-
ifies for the exemption.'",
Religious objectors have been provided with some form of
military exemption since 1775 when the First Continental Congress
passed a resolution to exempt those who, because of their "religious
principles," could not bear arms.s The Federal Conscription Law
of 1863" contained no such exemption but one was included in the
1864 Draft Law. 10 The Draft Act of 191711 restricted exemption to
members of "any well-recognized religious sect . . .whose existing
creed or principles [forbade] . . . its members to participate in
war in any form."'1 2 In 1940 Congress broadened the exemption
significantly by including not only members of the historic peace
churches but also individuals "who, by reason of religious training
and belief" are opposed to war in any form.13 The 1940 act was
modified in 194814 to include within the definition of "religious
training and belief" the requirement of "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being" with which the Seeger case deals.
Although the Court of Appeals decided Seeger on constitution-
3 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1964).
4 85 Sup. Ct. at 854.5 United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
6 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
7 United States v. Seeger, 85 Sup. Ct. 850, 854 (1965).
8 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 189 (1905).
9 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 731.
10 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9. The exemption extended to
conscientious objectors who were members of religious denominations pro-
hibited from bearing arms by the articles of faith of their denominations.
11 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76.
12 Id 40 Stat. at 78.
13 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
1450 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1951).
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al grounds,' the Supreme Court eschewed any constitutional de-
termination.16 Instead it chose to define the term "Supreme Being"
as something other than the orthodox concept of God. This defini-
tion served to resolve a conflict between the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits which existed between 1940 and 1948, and continued even
after Congress attempted to settle it in the 1948 amendment.
The conflict had its origin in 1943 in the broad definition of
"religious training and belief" supplied by Judge Augustus Hand
in United States v. Kauten.17 Hand said that "the provisions of the
present statute Ithe 1940 act] . . . take into account the character-
istics of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a con-
scientious scruple against war in any form, . . .the basis of exemp-
15 326 F.2d 846 (1965). The Court of Appeals had decided Seeger on the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
16 The Supreme Court has thus far refused to consider the constitutionality
of the "religious training and belief" and "Supreme Being" provisions.
Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
930 (1963) ; Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 843 (1952). However the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366
(1917), held that an even narrower religious exemption (see notes 8 and 9
and accompanying text supra) did not violate the guarantee of the first
amendment. Recent opinions of the Court contain language which indicates
that there is at least some doubt as to whether the Court will uphold the
Supreme Being test of § 456(j) against first amendment challenges when
it chooses to decide the question. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 217 (1962) ; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) ; McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-43 (1961) ; McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948) ; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
These decisions can be read to indicate that restricting the conscientious ob-
jector draft exemption to those who are "religious" and also who believe in a
"Supreme Being" would be unconstitutional as (1) aiding all religions, or
believers as against non-believers; (2) aiding religions based on belief in the
existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs,
grounds seemingly contrary to the prohibitions of Everson and Torcaso. See
Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso
v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252 (1963).
17 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). However, it should be noted that the language
concerning the definition of religion is no more than dictum, albeit per-
suasive since later cases have followed it. Kauten's appeal was turned
down on procedural grounds. See 133 F.2d at 705-06.
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tion."' ' He went on to say that religious belief under the act means
"a compelling voice of conscience," or "a response of the individual
to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God . ... "19 In a later
Second Circuit decision, United States ex. rel. Phillips v. Downer,2 0
absent the procedural infirmity which made the Kauten definition
dictum, Judge Clark reaffirmed the language of Kauten that a
''conscientious scruple against war in any form" is a sufficient basis
for exemption.2 1 In United States ex. rel. Reel v. Badt,22 the Second
Circuit again approved the Kauten language and held that opposi-
tion to war based on humanitarian considerations and not on any
obligation to a deity or supernatural power was sufficient to entitle
the registrant to a exemption.
23
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the reason-
ing of the Second Circuit and set forth a second, and narrower,
definition of "religion" in Berman v. United States.24 The court
said:
the expression "by reason of religious training and belief"
is plain language, and was written into the statute [the
1940 act] for the specific purpose of distinguishing be-
tween a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion
to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an
individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority
higher and beyond any wordly one.25
The court concluded that the registrant's "philosophy and morals
and social policy without the concept of deity" does not qualify
as "religion" under § 5 (g).26 Religion, according to Berman, is "be-
lief in relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
1SId. at 708.
19 Ibid.
20 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
21 Id. at 524. At the same time, Judge Clark warned that if a stricter rule than
was announced in the Kauten case is called for, one demanding a belief
which cannot be found among the philosophers, but only among religious
teachers of recognized organizations, then we are substantially or nearly
back to the requirement of the Act of 1917.
22 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944). Mr. Justice Frankfurter also quoted the
Kauten language with approval in a dissenting opinion in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943).
23 141 F.2d at 847.
24 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946). It is interesting
to note that the same procedural circumstances were present in Berman
that were present in Kauten but the United States Supreme Court, in Falbo
v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), had since decided that they did not
prevent the registrant from questioning the decision of the local draft and
appeal boards application of the "religious training and belief" requirement.
25 156 F.2d at 380.
26 Id. at 381.
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from any human relation, '2 7 while in Kauten, Downer, and Badt,
a conscientious scruple against war, not necessarily based on
any obligation to a deity, qualifies as "religion."
Congress apparently resolved the resultant dichotomy in 194828S
when it amended the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act. Con-
gress not only adopted the language from the Berman case nearly
word-for-word,2 9 but also expressly cited Berman . 0 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit accordingly held that an agnostic
could not be granted an exemption because his objections could
not be based on belief in a relation to a Supreme Being.3 1 However,
in United States v. Jakobson,32 the Second Circuit said that the
Supreme Being clause must be liberally interpreted to avoid con-
stitutional difficulties and continued to substantially follow its pre-
1948 views defining religion broadly.31 Despite the efforts of Con-
gress, the disparity in the definition of religion had been judicially
perpetuated. It was in this atmosphere that the Supreme Court
decided the Seeger case.
In Seeger, the Supreme Court purported to construe the words
of Congress in order to reach the conclusion that the "legislative
intent," as manifested in the language of the act, was to adopt a
broad definition of "religion" analogous to that applied in Kauten.
The Court determined that when Congress added the Supreme
Being qualification to the 1940 act it did so only to clarify its
original intent.3 4 According to the Court, the intent which Congress
felt obliged to clarify was not who was entitled to military exemp-
tion under the statute, but rather who was not so entitled.3 The
Court then concluded that the requirement of belief in a relation
27 Id. at 381, quoting the language of Mr. Justice Hughes in his dissent in
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931).
2862 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
29 The language of § 456 (j) declares that "religious training and belief" is to
be defined as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation ......
This language differs in only one particular from that in Berman, 156 F.2d
at 381, which in turn had been quoted from United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931). The statute contains the words "Supreme Being" in
place of the word "God" which appears in Berman and Macintosh.
30 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948): "This exemption [ §
456(j) ] extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief
in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant
military service or to both combatant and non-combatant military service.
(See United States v. Berman, 156 F.2d 377, certiorari denied, 329 U.S.
795.)"
31 United States v. De Lime, 233 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1955).
32 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963). Jakobson, as well as Peter v. United States,
324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1964), was decided by the Supreme Court as a com-
panion case to Seeger.
33 Id. at 413-14.
34 85 Sup. Ct. at 861.
35 Id. at 860.
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to a Supreme Being was not a restrictive test and a conscientious
objector could qualify for exemption even though he could not
avow a belief in a Supreme Being. 6 Consequently, the Supreme
Being requirement which caused Seeger's draft board to refuse
him an exemption 37 was judicially interpreted out of existence. It
seems to be stretching logic to conclude that Congress intended an
amendment to clear up an area where there was no disagreement
3 s
36 Id. at 854.
37 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1964).
38 See, e.g., Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 795 (1946) ; United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
The decisions agreed that exemption must be denied to those whose beliefs
were political, social, or philosophical in nature.
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and intended to ignore an area where there was a great deal of
conflict .31
In searching for the proper congressional intent to enable it
to avoid the constitutional issues, the Court decided that Congress
did not intend to solve any conflict between Berman and Kauten
because "if it [Congress] thought that two clashing interpretations
as to what amounted to 'religious belief' had to be resolved, it
would have said so somewhere in its deliberations. '40 The Court
minimized the fact that Congress in the 1948 amendment used,
almost word-for-word, 41 language from the Berman opinion.
42
Neither was the Court influenced by the Government's argument
that since Congress cited Berman in the Senate Report 4'3 Congress
intended to adopt the Berman definition of religion. The Court
avoided that construction by saying that the citation was for a dif-
ferent purpose: to reaffirm what was not, rather than what was,
a sufficient "religious belief" to qualify for exemption.4 4 This
conclusion, however, is of doubtful validity when the citation is
considered in the context in which it was made.45 The Court also
attempted to minimize the import of the citation by saying a mere
"parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for a number
of things"4 6 is outweighed by the "explicit statement of congress-
ional intent ' 47 that, "this section reenacts substantially the same
provisions as were found in subsection 5 (g) of the 1940 act."
48
Perhaps the most intellectually honest basis for the decision
was expounded by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in
which he said the case was just another instance "where we have
gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from
demise on constitutional grounds. ' '41 It would be accurate to say
that rather than finding what Congress's intent was, the Court
found what Congress's intent should have been.
The test established by the Court in Seeger directs the local
39 I.e., the Berman - Kauten conflict as to the definitions of "religion".
40 85 Sup. Ct. at 860.
41 See supra note 29.
42 85 Sup. Ct. at 859. The court did this by saying that the language used came
originally from United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), an earlier
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes which the Court pointed out "supports
our interpretation." 85 Sup. Ct. at 860.
43 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
44 85 Sup. Ct. at 860.
45 Supra note 30.
46 85 Sup. Ct. at 859.
47 Ibid.
48 85 Sup. Ct. at 857, quoting from S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1948).
49 85 Sup. Ct. at 865. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 433 (1956);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953) ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 341, 348 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
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draft boards and courts to "decide whether the beliefs professed
by a registrant are [1] sincerely held and [2] whether they are,
in his own scheme of things, religious." 50 A belief is "religious"
when it "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
.... "51 These beliefs may be either externally or internally de-
rived.52 The Court also gave approval to the portion of the act
which says that objection cannot be based on a "merely personal
moral code," 53 although its application may be limited by the
Court's statement that there can be no distinction "between ex-
ternally and internally derived beliefs.
'54
In spite of the broad interpretation the Supreme Court has
given § 456(j), two things are apparent. First, the Court is still
faced with the potential issue of whether § 456(j) violates the es-
tablishment clause of the first amendment, but that question can
be properly raised only by an atheist.5 5 If the statute is held to be
unconstitutional on that ground, Congress will have to draft an-
other exemption and avoid conditioning it on "religious beliefs."
Failure to provide any exemption could in turn be challenged as a
violation of the first amendment right to the free exercise of
religion. Second, those who must administer the act - the draft
boards and the courts - still must make two difficult determina-
tions from rather nebulous standards: (1) Is the applicant sincere?
(2) Are the applicant's objections based on a "religious belief" as
defined in Seeger? While the Court's decision in Seeger broadened
the definition of "religion," it certainly did not make the standards
for exemption any clearer. Resolution of both the constitutional
and administrative problems presented by § 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act could be realized if Congress
would grant a military service exemption to all those persons who
sincerely object to participation in war in any form. After Seeger,
the next step in the evolution of the conscientious objector exemp-
tion should be taken by the Legislature. However, it is doubtful
that Congress will choose to act.
56
Richard M. Koon
50 85 Sup. Ct. at 863.
51 Id. at 859.
52 Id. at 864.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 85 Sup. Ct. at 858.
56 The American Civil Liberties Union urged a somewhat similar non-religious
exemption in 1940 which was rejected by Congress. Hearings on S. 4164 Be-




THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THE COMMON MARKET.
By DR. ULRICH EVERLING. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House,
Inc. Pp. xv, 219. $15.00.
This book, a translation from German of an identically entitled
study written by Dr. Ulrich Everling - Ministerialrat in the Minis-
try of Economics of the Federal Republic of Germany - presents
the reader with a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Rome
Treaty relating to the right of individuals and companies of the
Member States of the European Economic Community to carry on
business activities in the Common Market. Freedom of establish-
ment involves the right to commence and conduct non-wage-earning
activities (selbstandige Erwerbstatigkeiten, activites non salariees)
which cover not only commercial and industrial operations (includ-
ing banking, insurance, transport, agriculture, fishing, etc.) but also
activities of individuals engaged in the liberal professions (lawyers,
doctors, accountants and so on).
The author emphasizes that the provisions on the right of es-
tablishment must be seen in the over-all context of the basic ob-
jectives of the Common Market which include increased mobility of
the factors of production through the elimination of customs and
trade barriers, enabling nationals and companies to pursue inde-
pendent economic activities anywhere in the Community, either in
the form of an establishment or through services. Since it is through
the free interchange of capital and labor that the right of establish-
ment can become fully effective and meaningful, the various mea-
sures - as, for instance, the mutual recognition of diplomas and
other evidences of qualification-for the elimination of discrimina-
tory restrictions on free movement and for coordination as-
sume particular significance. Apart from its economic importance,
the right of establishment, by promoting a general feeling of soli-
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darity among the peoples of the Community, may be expected to
contribute to a strengthening of their political ties.
While the right of establishment is accorded only to individuals
and companies of the Community and, therefore, is primarily of in-
terest to them, this English edition also contains in its "Introduc-
tion" a brief but valuable discussion of some of the implications for
nationals and companies of non-Member States which may be read
with benefit by businessmen and professionals having contacts with












ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY. By
Wayne R. LaFave. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1965. Pp. xxxiv,
540. $10.00. This is the first publication resulting from studies on
the administration of criminal justice sponsored by the American
Bar Foundation. Current practices are examined in order to answer
such questions as: Who makes the decision to arrest? How is it con-
trolled in order to assure consistency and fairness? Why do the po-
lice at times act other than in strict conformity with existing laws?
The study examines each problem which relates to the arrest de-
cision.
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE Eco-
NOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION. Edited by Alfred F. Conrad, James
N. Morgan, Robert W. Pratt, Jr., Charles E. Voltz, and Robert L.
Bombaugh. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1964. Pp.
xxviii, 506. $12.50. This book is the first comprehensive study of
what happens to automobile victims after their injury. On the basis
of extensive field surveys, the authors report on the amount of
money that injury victims lose, how much they are paid, the suc-
cess of damage suits settled in and out of court, and many other
related matters.
INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS. Edited by Gotz M. Pollzien
and George B. Bronfen. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1965. Pp. xxxv,
426. $22.50. This new book consists of comprehensive reports on na-
tional licensing laws in 22 foreign and North American countries,
and explores supra-national rules of the European Common Mar-
ket. Each of the 22 reports is written by a distinguished specialist
in his own country.
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION. By Fowler V.
Harper. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1965. Pp. xxv, 406. $6.95. A
searching biography of a man who considered himself an associate
rather than an Associate Justice, and his commitment to the Bill
of Rights. Special emphasis is placed on Rutledge's years on the
Supreme Court, and more particularly on his attitude and judicial
pronouncements on the first eight amendments to the Constitution.
MORALITY OF LAW, THE. By Lon L. Fuller. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 1964. Pp. vii, 202. $5.00. Mr. Fuller probes the relation
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of law to morality and suggests that the dilemmas posed by the as-
sociation are not easily solved because the internal morality of law
is not independent of the power of law but an essential condition of
that power.
REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS. By Ezra
Weiss. Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1965. Pp. xxvii,
363. $17.50. An up-to-date handbook and reference guide which ex-
plains the rules, regulations, qualifications, and responsibilities
governing: (1) the entrance of persons into the securities business,
and (2) the manner in which registered brokers and dealers must
operate in order to comply with SEC requirements.
STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION. By Ernst Freund. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press. 1965. Pp. li, 327. Cloth: $5.50.
Paper: $2.45. In this second edition of his book, Mr Freund suggests
the possibility of supplementing the established doctrine of ex post
facto enforcement of legislative norms through review and nega-
tion with a system of positive principles which should guide and
control the enactment of statutes.
STATUTE MAKING. By Armand B. Coigne. New York: CCH. 1965.
Pp. 293. $12.50. The history of a legislative bill from inception to
final passage or defeat is the subject of this book. The author, as-
suming no prior knowledge on the part of the reader, discusses de-
finitively the many processes involved in enacting statutes at fed-
eral, state, and local levels of government. This second edition in-
corporates statutory and constitutional changes which have oc-
curred since 1948, when the first edition appeared.
VOL. XLI
BAR BRIEFS
OPINION NO. 34 OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE
OF THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED MARCH 27, 1965
SYLLABUS
It is improper for a lawyer in a personal injury case to advance
living expenses to or for the benefit of his injured client.
FACTS
A lawyer handles personal injury cases. He desires to advance
funds for living expenses to his injured clients, with the under-
standing that he will be reimbursed at the time the case is conclud-
ed and that such reimbursement will be in addition to any fee for
professional services. The Committee has been asked whether such
a practice violates the Canons of Ethics.
OPINION
The Committee is of the opinion that such a practice clearly
violates Canons 6 and 10. Canon 42 outlines the limits which must
be observed and clearly does not authorize this practice.
The principal objection to this practice is that it amounts to the
purchase by the lawyer of an interest in the litigation. This is clear-
ly prohibited by Canon 10. This is true whether or not the client's
agreement to reimburse the lawyer is contingent on recovery. A
client whose assets are so meager that he requires advances from
his counsel to live is unlikely to have any realistic chance of repay-
ing such advances if there is no recovery on his claim.
This practice, by giving the lawyer an additional stake in the
case beyond his fees, places the attorney in a situation where his
own personal pecuniary interests may well conflict with the best
interests of his client and make it impossible for him to represent
the client with the undivided fidelity required by Canon 6. While
this conflict exists already with respect to counsel fees (particular-
ly in contingent fee cases), we feel that it should not be extended
to a situation where the lawyer seeks not only compensation but
reimbursement.
The justification usually given in support of the practice of ad-
vancing living expenses is that it eliminates the urgency of an in-
jured person's need for funds as a factor to be considered in dispos-
ing of the case, either by settlement or by trial, and tends to pre-
vent the disparity in economic status usually present in personal
injury cases from being a factor in the case. The Committee recog-
nizes that such economic disparity exists in many cases, that it
ought not to affect the outcome of the cases, and that, unfortunate-
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ly, it sometimes does. The Committee is of the opinion, however,
that the practice of having a lawyer advance living costs is not an
appropriate nor professionally proper method of resolving the prob-
lem. The law is a profession and those engaging therein must use
all of the skills of that profession on behalf of those who seek their
counsel. Money lending is not one of those professional skills. A
remedy for the problem created by economic disparity of litigants
must be sought in the proper use of professional skills.
This question has been considered elsewhere. In Opinion 288 by
the ABA Ethics Committee, 41 ABA Journal 33, the Committee con-
cluded that such a practice was improper. A like conclusion was
reached recently by the Ohio Supreme Court in Mahoning County
Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio 263, 199 N.E.2d 396 (1964). This Com-
mittee agrees with these authorities and, like them, is not persuad-
ed by People v. McCallum, 341 Ill. 578, 173 N.E. 827 (1930), in which
the Illinois Supreme Court reaches a different conclusion.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the practice, if publicized,
constitutes a holding out by the lawyer of an improper inducement
to clients to employ him, in addition to the assurance of performing
legal services for the client (see Canon 27).
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